The State v Tom Morris [1981] PNGLR 493

• Jurisdiction: Papua New Guinea
• Judge: Miles J
• Judgment Date: 28 May 1980
• Citation: [1981] PNGLR 493
• Court: National Court
• Year: 1981
• Judgement Number: N228

Full Title: The State v Tom Morris [1981] PNGLR 493

National Court: Miles J

Judgment Delivered: 28 May 1980

1 Criminal law—Submission of no case to answer—tests to be applied—role of trial judge

CRIMINAL LAW—Evidence—Burden of proof—Circumstantial evidence—Inferences to be drawn—Question of fact—Relationship of inferences to finding of guilt—Overall view of case.

CRIMINAL LAW—Practice and procedure—Submission of no case to answer—Whether unsafe and dangerous to convict—Discretion—When exercisable—Circumstantial evidence—Overall view of case.

When a case against an accused person rests substantially upon circumstantial evidence the question for the court is whether the guilt of the accused is the only rational inference that all the circumstances would enable it to draw.

Barca v R (1975) 133 CLR 82 at 104; 50 ALJR 108 at 117 followed and applied.

Where there are a number of competing inferences it is a question of fact for the court to decide which inferences should be drawn, which rejected, which are reasonable, which are mere conjecture, and which party, if any, they favour.

Where at the end of the prosecution case there are inferences inconsistent with the guilt of the accused, there is a discretion to acquit, but only where an overall view of the case leaves the court with the conclusion that it would be unsafe and dangerous to convict.

The State v Paul Kundi Rape [1976] PNGLR 96 considered.

The State v Aige Kola [1979] PNGLR 620 discussed.

Interlocutory Judgment.

At the close of the case for the prosecution on a charge of wilful murder counsel for the accused submitted that there was no case to answer or alternatively that the court should exercise a discretion not to proceed further because on the evidence as it stood it would be unsafe and dangerous to convict.

___________________________

Miles J: The accused is charged with the wilful murder of Leo Alamuk in Papua New Guinea on about 19 October 1979. The evidence shows that the deceased died as a result of a depressed fracture of the frontal part of the skull. The fracture extended through both plates of the skull. The fracture caused an epidural haematoma with resultant compression of the brain leading to death. The injury was consistent with a blow from an axe or tomahawk. There was evidence that the axe belonged to the accused and was in his possession on the day of 19 October 1979, before the deceased received the injury and after the time when the deceased was last seen alive.

At the close of the prosecution case Mr Formosa for the accused asked that I not call upon the accused to answer the charge on the basis that there is no evidence upon which the accused may be convicted, alternatively that I should exercise a discretion not to proceed further in the case because on the evidence as it stands it would be unsafe and dangerous to convict.

It was suggested by Mr Formosa that there was a third alternative, namely that I should acquit the accused on the basis that even though I may not have heard all the evidence (because the accused still had the opportunity to present his case) I should have a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. This submission was said to flow from the judgment of Kapi J in The State v Aige Kola [1979] PNGLR 620. I do not read the decision in that way. His Honour refers to grave doubts (my emphasis) which are considerably different from a reasonable doubt. His Honour also found that the evidence would not improve whether the accused gave evidence or not. I cannot make such a finding...