NOT PRECEDENTIAL

U N IT E D STATES COURT OF APPEALS

F O R THE THIRD CIRCUIT

N O . 06-1804

S T E V E N C. THOMPSON,

Appellant

v. E V A 'S VILLAGE AND SHELTERING PROGRAM;

D E R R IC K WILLIAMS, INDIVIDUALLY;

G R E G O R Y ANDERSON, INDIVIDUALLY;

G L O R Y PEREZ, INDIVIDUALLY;

A N T H O N Y MCCANTS, INDIVIDUALLY;

B R Y A N T JENKINS, INDIVIDUALLY;

G R E A T E R PATERSON AREA, INC.;

W O R L D SERVICE ORGANIZATION, INC.;

N A R C O T IC S ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVICES, INC.

O n Appeal From the United States District Court

F o r the District of New Jersey

(D .C . Civ. No. 04-cv-02548)

D is tric t Judge: Honorable Joel A. Pisano

S u b m itte d Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

J u n e 6, 2007

B e f o re : RENDELL, HARDIMAN AND COWEN, CIRCUIT JUDGES.

(F ile d : June 18, 2007)

O P IN IO N P E R CURIAM S te v e n Thompson appeals the District Court's order granting appellees' motions fo r summary judgment. The procedural history of this case and the details of appellant's c la im s are well-known to the parties, set forth in the District Court's opinion, and need n o t be discussed at length. Briefly, Thompson alleged in his complaint that he was barred f ro m a Narcotics Anonymous meeting based on his religious beliefs. He alleged that a p p e lle e s ' actions violated his constitutional rights as well as federal and state statutes.

The District Court granted appellees' motions for summary judgment, and Thompson f iled a timely notice of appeal.

W e have jurisdiction under 12U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over th e District Court's order granting appellees' motion for summary judgment. Gallo v. C ity of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 1998). A grant of summary judgment w ill be affirmed if our review reveals that "there is no genuine issue as to any material f ac t and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.

5 6 (c). We review the facts in a light most favorable to the party against whom summary ju d g m e n t was entered. See Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. American States Life Ins.

C o ., 10 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir. 1993).

T h o m p so n argues on appeal that the District Court failed to reasonably a c co m m o d a te his disability. However, he does not specify any accommodation he re q u ire d which was denied. In the District Court he asked the District Court to stop " ru s h in g the proceedings, raising unrelated, irrelevant or confusing issues to distract me" a s well as "denying oral argument or telephone conference." The docket reflects that the D is tric t Court granted Thompson several extensions of time. Thompson has not e x p la in e d why he was entitled to oral argument; his voluminous filings demonstrate that h e was able to communicate with the Court through his written pleadings.

Thompson argues that the appellees are not entitled to immunity under the New J e rs e y Charitable Immunity Act. However, in its November 14, 2005, letter order, the D is tric t Court noted that Charitable Immunity Act only applies to claims of negligence a n d that Thompson had not raised any negligence claims. The District Court concluded th a t the Charitable Immunity Act was inapplicable.

T h o m p s o n contends that the appellees were acting as agents of the state when they v iolated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. We agree with the District Court th a t the appellees are not state actors. See, e.g., Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 341 (3d C ir. 2005) (regulation and receipt of government funds, without more, does not constitute sta te action). Thus, Thompson's claims arising under the First and Fourteenth A m e n d m e n ts , § 1983, and § 1985 fail. We further agree with the District Court that a p p e lle e s were entitled to summary judgment on Thompson's claims arising under 42 U .S .C . § 2000e.

T h o m p s o n argues that appellees violated his rights under the New Jersey Law A g a in s t Discrimination. However, the District Court declined to exercise supplemental ju ris d ic tio n over Thompson's New Jersey state law claims. The District Court did not a b u se its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction or in denying T h o m p so n 's motion to amend his complaint.

F in a lly, we address Thompson's arguments that District Court Judge Pisano and M a g is tra te Judge Arleo should have recused themselves. A litigant's displeasure with the D is tric t Court's legal rulings is not an adequate basis for recusal. Securacomm C o n s u ltin g , Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). Thompson argues th a t his filing a lawsuit against Judges Pisano and Arleo is a ground for recusal.

This Court has already addressed this issue in a prior appeal in this case. In T h o m p so n v. Eva's Village, C.A. No. 05-4618, we thoroughly addressed Thompson's a lleg a tio n s and informed him that his lawsuit against the Judges did not provide a basis f o r recusal. Thompson's unfounded accusations against the District Court Judges and th e ir staff are inappropriate. "Litigants are understandably disappointed when they do not p re v a il in court, but that does not give them the license to attack the integrity of the jud iciary. Such abusive conduct will not be tolerated, not even from a pro se litigant." In re Mann, 229 F.3d 657, 659 (7th Cir. 2000).

F o r the above reasons, as well as those set forth by the District Court, we will a f f irm the District Court's judgment. Thompson's motion for attorneys fees and costs is d e n ie d . Thompson is neither an attorney nor the prevailing party. See 42U.S.C. § 1 9 8 8 (b ). Thompson's motions to strike appellee Greater Paterson Area's brief and for s a n c tio n s are denied.