November 29, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 94-1714

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

FREDERIC W. BERTHOFF,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]

Selya, Circuit Judge,

Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Cyr, Circuit Judge.

Michael C. Andrews, with whom Brian J. McMenimen was on brief for

appellant.

William C. Brown, Attorney, Appellate Division, Department of

Justice, with whom Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, was on

brief for appellee.

CYR, Circuit Judge. Along with five associates, CYR, Circuit Judge.

appellant Frederic W. Berthoff was indicted on seventeen felony

charges. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of conspiring

to possess marijuana and hashish with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841, 846 (Count 1), possessing hashish with intent to

distribute, id. 841 (Count 2), and money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a) (Counts 7-14). We affirm the district court judgment.

I I

BACKGROUND1 BACKGROUND

On several occasions between 1984 and 1986, Berthoff

enlisted Brad Welch, Stephen Marble and Albert Mello to transport

marijuana and its proceeds from Florida and Arizona to Massachu-

setts. Berthoff himself went along on at least one trip. In

addition, between 1984 and 1991 Berthoff sold large quantities of

marijuana to or through Welch, Mello, Thomas Cimeno, and Wes

Schifone.

During the 1986-87 period, Berthoff expanded the scope

of his illegal drug operation by arranging to finance and import

4,000 pounds of hashish from Portugal for distribution in the

United States. Some of the hashish was stored at Berthoff's

Massachusetts residence. It was sold both within Massachusetts

and elsewhere. In 1988, Scott Holland, a coconspirator in the

hashish importation, was arrested on unrelated criminal charges.

1We relate the evidence in the light most favorable to the

verdicts. United States v. Tuesta-Toro, 29 F.3d 771, 773 (1st

Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 947 (1995).

2

Shortly thereafter, Berthoff reassured another coconspirator,

Cimeno, that Holland would not inform on them because Berthoff

was selling Holland's share of the hashish, and holding the

proceeds for Holland.

In November 1988, Berthoff and Mello traveled to

Zurich, Switzerland, where they opened a bank account and depos-

ited $90,000 in drug proceeds. Upon his return to Massachusetts,

Berthoff wrote the Swiss bank and authorized a $75,000 withdrawal

and wire transfer to Mello in Massachusetts. After Mello re-

ceived the transfer, he drove to Key West, Florida, and deposited

the proceeds in a bank account previously established for the

purpose. The funds eventually were transferred by Mello into a

corporate bank account controlled by Berthoff. On another

occasion, Berthoff made a $100,000 interest-free loan from

illegal drug proceeds to Cimeno, insisting that Cimeno repay the

loan with checks identifying the payments as returns on a real

estate investment.

II II

DISCUSSION DISCUSSION

A. Count 1 A. Count 1

Count I charged Berthoff and five codefendants with

conspiring to possess and distribute marijuana and hashish

between 1984 and 1991. Berthoff contends that the government

improperly charged a single ongoing drug-distribution conspiracy

which encompassed all the alleged marijuana and hashish transac-

tions, and that it did so because all but the 1987 hashish-

3

related conduct would have been time-barred had separate conspir-

acies been charged. Thus, he asserts, a single conspiracy was

alleged in order to fortify the government's weak case against

Berthoff relating to the hashish by enabling otherwise inadmissi-

ble "prior bad acts" evidence (i.e., pre-1988 marijuana-related

conduct) to be introduced at trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).

Finally, as Berthoff sees it, the government's evidence rational-

ly could support only an inference that he had engaged in a

series of isolated buy-sell arrangements (viz., multiple conspir-

acies), see United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1394 (7th

Cir. 1991), and thus the evidence worked a material variance from

the single conspiracy charged in the indictment.

The existence, vel non, of a single conspiracy is an

issue of fact. See United States v. Oreto, 37 F.3d 739, 747 (1st

Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1161 (1995). Thus, an

appellant is faced with "a `heavy burden' to show the evidence

precludes the findings made by the jury." Id. (citation omit-

ted). Viewing the evidence and all fair inferences therefrom in

the light most favorable to the government, a guilty verdict will

not be disturbed unless no rational jury could have found that

each element of the offense was established beyond a reasonable

doubt. See United States v. Tuesta Toro, 29 F.3d 771, 776 (1st

Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 947 (1995).

We find that the variance claim fails because the

government adduced sufficient evidence at trial to enable a

rational inference that there was a single conspiracy, as alleged

4

in the indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Bello-Perez, 977

F.2d 664, 667-68 (1st Cir. 1992) ("pursuant to their tacit or

express agreement, [the conspirators] knowingly and intentionally

'directed their efforts towards the accomplishment of a common

goal or overall plan' to commit the substantive offense charged

in the indictment.") (citation omitted). The overarching goal of

Berthoff's constantly expanding operation was drug trafficking,

whether in marijuana or hashish. The government established that

there was a significant overlap in the timing of the marijuana

and hashish operations, as well as consistent methods of operat-

ing, participants, and locations. See, e.g., United States v. David, 940 F.2d 722, 734 (1st Cir. 1991) (outlining factors

distinguishing single conspiracies from multiple conspiracies),

cert. denied, 504 U.S. 955 (1992). For example, though Berthoff

maintains that he "hired" Welch, Marble, and Mello to make only

one-time trips from Florida to Massachusetts prior to 1986, with

no contemporaneous expectation or plan to "hire" them for subse-

quent jobs, the jury could have found otherwise based on Mello's

testimony alone. Mello testified, in pertinent part: "Q.

[defense counsel]: You did that trip [to Florida], you got paid,

and that was a closed chapter as far as that trip was concerned,

right? . . . So you had no idea whether or not you would be asked

to make another trip a month later, did you? A. [Mello]: I had a

pretty good idea I'd be asked." We conclude that there was no

variance.

Berthoff next contends that the district court should

5

have instructed the jury that it could not convict unless it

found a single conspiracy. Since Berthoff asserted no contempo-

raneous objection, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 30, we review only for

plain error. See United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1776-

77 (1993) ("plain error" is error that is both "obvious" and

"seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation

of the judicial proceedings"). There was no error, plain or

otherwise. A refusal to give a particular jury instruction

cannot be challenged successfully on appeal if the charge given

by the court substantially covered the requested matter. See

United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 244 (1st Cir.), cert.

denied, 498 U.S. 849 (1990). Here, the district court gave an

adequate instruction.2

B. Count 2 B. Count 2

Count 2 charged that Berthoff possessed hashish, with

intent to distribute. The jury was misinstructed that "you may

not convict any of these people of this charge unless the infer-

ence that you draw convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that

the person accused intended to distribute the marijuana or

hashish or cause its distribution." Although the district court,

2The final charge informed the jury as follows: "Now, where

persons join together to further one common unlawful design or

purpose, a single conspiracy exists. By way of contrast, multi-

ple conspiracies exist when there are separate unlawful agree-

ments to achieve distinct purposes. Proof of several separate

and independent conspiracies is not proof of a single overall

conspiracy charged in the indictment unless, of course, one of

the separate conspiracies proved happens to be the single con-

spiracy described in the indictment." See Oreto, 37 F.3d at 747.

6

on five other occasions in its final charge, correctly instructed

on the evidentiary showing required to convict under Count 2

(viz., that conviction could not be based on Berthoff's post-1987

possession of marijuana only), Berthoff contends that this

inadvertence constituted a constructive amendment of the indict-

ment. See, e.g., United States v. Vavlitis, 9 F.3d 206, 210 (1st

Cir. 1993). Since there was no contemporaneous objection, we

review for plain error. Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 1776.3

Evaluating the jury instructions as a whole, see

Boylan, 898 F.2d at 244, we find no "possibility that the convic-

tion [on Count 2] rest[ed] upon an offense not charged." United

States v. Dunn, 758 F.2d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 1985). As the trial

court instructed the jury, the only evidence that Berthoff's

codefendant Scott Holland may have been connected to the conspir-

acy charged in Count 1 was Berthoff's admission to Cimeno, in

1988, that he was holding Holland's share of the hashish and that

he would sell it and hold the proceeds for Holland's benefit.4 4

3Berthoff incorrectly claims on appeal that the verdict form

exacerbated this instructional error. Quite the contrary, the

verdict form indicated that Count 2 charged "possession of

marijuana and hashish." The conjunctive phrasing could only

heighten the government's burden of proof. See, e.g., United

States v. Cantrell, 999 F.2d 1290, 1292 (8th Cir. 1993), cert.

denied, 114 S. Ct. 885 (1994). In all events, since the indict-

ment went to the jury room during deliberations, and the district

court correctly instructed with respect to Count 2 on five other

occasions, we discern no plain error.

4Berthoff argues that it was error to deny his motion to

strike the testimony of three alleged coconspirators (Mello,

Cimeno and Schifone) who testified against Berthoff at trial in

return for a government promise to recommend a "substantial

assistance" departure. See U.S.S.G. 5K1.1. We find no error.

See United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192, 196 (1st Cir. 1985)

7

Thus, the jury could not have convicted Holland on Count 1, as it

did, unless it found that Berthoff had made a truthful statement

to Cimeno in 1988 that Berthoff then possessed, and was then

distributing, Holland's share of the hashish, see supra p. 3, the

identical predicate finding needed for Berthoff's conviction on

Count 2.

C. Counts 7-14 C. Counts 7-14

Count 7 charged that "[o]n or about February 10,

1989,"5 Berthoff laundered drug proceeds "in Massachusetts and

in the Southern District of Florida" by transferring the Swiss

bank funds to Florida. Berthoff argues that the government

failed to adduce sufficient evidence to establish proper venue in

Massachusetts. See United States v. Georgacarakos, 988 F.2d 1289,

1293 (1st Cir. 1993) (government must prove venue by preponder-

ance of evidence). We do not agree.

(noting that where an accomplice testifies pursuant to a plea

agreement, "the 'established safeguards' are that the jury be

informed of the exact nature of the agreement, that defense

counsel be permitted to cross-examine the accomplice about the

agreement, and that the jury be specifically instructed to weigh

the accomplice's testimony with care"); see also United States v. Rullan-Rivera, 60 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1995).

5Berthoff also argues that the Swiss bank funds transfer

arrived in Massachusetts in December 1988, so that the reference

in the indictment that the offense occurred "[o]n or about

February 10, 1989" was fatally misleading. We have not

required "strict chronological specificity or accuracy" when "a

particular date is not a substantive element of the crime

charged." United States v. Morris, 700 F.2d 427, 429 (1st Cir.),

cert. denied, 461 U.S. 947 (1983). Having been charged with

laundering funds from Switzerland, through Massachusetts and on

to Florida, Berthoff was in no sense "misinformed of the charges

against him," nor did the reference to an approximate time frame

"otherwise affect[] his substantial rights." United States v. Arcadipane, 41 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1994).

8

Normally, venue is proper in any district wherein a

criminal offense was committed. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 18. Fur-

ther, "[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by enactment of

Congress, any offense against the United States begun in one

district and completed in another, or committed in more than one

district, may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district in

which such offense was begun, continued, or completed." 18 U.S.C. 3237(a) (emphasis added); see Georgacarakos, 988 F.2d at

1293. The statute further provides that "[a]ny offense involving

the use of mails, transportation in interstate or foreign com-

merce, or the importation of an object or person into the United

States is a continuing offense and, except as otherwise expressly

provided by enactment of Congress, may be inquired of and prose-

cuted in any district from, through, or into which such commerce,

mail matter, or imported object or person moves." 18 U.S.C. 3237(a) (emphasis added). Thus, the actual transfer of the funds

from Switzerland to Mello's Massachusetts residence plainly

enabled the jury to find proper venue in Massachusetts.

Finally, the remaining money laundering charges

Counts 8-14 involved Berthoff's 1988 interest-free "loan" to

Cimeno. Berthoff contends that Cimeno's loan repayments were not

competent evidence of money laundering because Cimeno testified

that he used the loan proceeds to purchase land and construct a

duplex, and that he repaid Berthoff from the "legitimate" pro-

ceeds realized from the subsequent sale of the duplex, rather

than from "proceeds of unlawful activity." This claim is frivo-

9

lous. The jury supportably found that Berthoff arranged the so-

called Cimeno "loan" for the purpose of filtering the illegal

drug proceeds and altering their form so as to appear "legiti-

mate." See United States v. Isabel, 945 F.2d 1193, 1200-03 (1st

Cir. 1991). This finding in no sense entailed a determination

that either the loan to Cimeno, or the acquisition and sale of

the duplex, transformed the illegal drug proceeds previously

deposited in the Swiss bank into proceeds from legitimate activi-

ties.

Affirmed. Affirmed.

10