[D O NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FILED

F O R THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

JUNE 19, 2006

THOMAS K. KAHN

N o . 05-15144

CLERK

N o n - A r g u m e n t Calendar

D . C. Docket No. 93-00006-CR-OC-20-HTS

U N IT E D STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ALLEN D. POWERSTEIN,

Defendant-Appellant.

A p p e al from the United States District Court

fo r the Middle District of Florida

(June 19, 2006)

B efo re TJOFLAT, ANDERSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges.

P E R CURIAM:

In 1993, a federal grand jury indicted appellant on thirteen counts involving

th e crimes of tax fraud and tax evasion. Pursuant to a plea agreement in which he w aiv ed his right to appeal any sentence imposed within the sentence range p rescrib ed by the Sentencing Guidelines, appellant pled guilty to counts one and elev en of the indictment, and in March 1994, the district court sentenced him to c o n c u r r e n t prison terms of sixty-three months, to be followed by a three-year term o f supervised release. Appellant appealed his sentences. We dismissed his appeal in May 1998, on the ground that he had waived his right to challenge his sentences.

United States v. Powerstein, No. 94-2491 (11th Cir. 1998) (unpublished).

In an effort to have his plea agreement and sentences set aside, appellant r etu r n e d to the district court, filing a series of motions. The district court denied h is motions, the final ruling occurring on January 19, 1999. In the order entered th at day, the court denied appellant's December 28, 1998 motion on the ground th at it constituted a successive motion for 42U.S.C. § 2255 relief. Appellant appealed that ruling. On June 20, 2000, concluding that appellant's December 28 m o tio n was not a successive § 2255 motion, we vacated the court's January 19 o rd er and remanded the case for further proceedings. Powerstein v. United States, N o . 99-13170 (11th Cir. 2000) (unpublished).

While the appeal in No. 99-13170 was pending, appellant, continuing his effo rt to litigate the sentencing issues he had waived in the plea agreement, filed a v ariety of motions in the district court, including a renewed motion for writ of error co ram nobis. In August 1999, after the court had denied some of these motions, ap p ellan t appealed the rulings. No. 99-13315. We dismissed the appeal for want o f prosecution on December 14, 1999.

Meanwhile, in October 1999, the district court denied appellant's renewed m o tio n for a writ of error coram nobis; in December 1999, the court denied his m o tio n for reconsideration of that ruling. Appellant appealed, No. 00-10432. In S ep tem b er 2001, we affirmed.

Appellant was released from prison and completed his term of supervised r ele as e in November 2001. Thereafter, he resumed his effort to obtain collateral r elie f in the district court and in this court.1 On July 21, 2005, the district court h eld a hearing in which it reviewed the history of appellant's case. The court told ap p ellan t that he had exhausted every claim that might have merit and that it in ten d ed to enter an order barring him from filing additional pleadings attacking h is convictions and sentences. The court gave appellant thirty days to brief his o b jectio n s to the proposed ban. Appellant filed a brief challenging the court's au th o rity to enter the proposed order. After the Government responded, and ap p ellan t filed an omnibus motion in opposition, the court entered an order barring a p p e lla n t "from filing any other pleading or documents of any kind in this case, s u b je ct to the pains and penalties of contempt of court, unless this Court is ordered b y the Eleventh Circuit . . . or the Supreme Court . . . to accept the filing." Appellant appeals that order.

A p p ellan t contends that the district court: (1) abused its discretion in en terin g the order; (2) lacked authority to enter the order; and (3) violated his co n stitu tio n al rights regarding double jeopardy by entering the order because, if he v io lates it and is found in contempt, he will be punished once again for conduct for w h ich he has already served a prison term.

We review a district court's grant of injunctive relief for abuse of discretion an d will affirm unless the district court made a clear error of judgment.

SunAmerica Corp. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 77 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th C ir. 1996). We review questions of constitutional law de novo. United States v. N o el, 231 F.3d 833, 836 (11th Cir. 2000).

Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before an y governmental deprivation of a property or liberty interest. Zipperer v. City of F o rt Myers, 41 F.3d 619, 623 (11th Cir. 1995). Meaningful access to the courts is a right of constitutional significance. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 4 1 5 & n.12, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 2187 & n.12, 153 L.Ed.2d 413 (2002). Thus, a p p e lla n t was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before the court im p o sed the injunctive order complained of.

Courts, however, have the jurisdiction to protect themselves against abusive litig an ts. Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1073 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc).

"Federal courts have both the inherent power and the constitutional obligation to p ro tect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability to carry out A rticle III functions. . . . The court has a responsibility to prevent single litigants fro m unnecessarily encroaching on the judicial machinery needed by others." Id. at 1073-74 (citation omitted). A litigant "can be severely restricted as to what he m ay file and how he must behave in his applications for judicial relief. He just can n o t be completely foreclosed from any access to the court." Id. at 1074.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in entering the injunctive order b efo re us. First, to satisfy due process requirements, the court provided appellant w ith adequate notice and an opportunity to respond. Second, the court did not p lace appellant at risk of double jeopardy since any future incarceration would serv e as a contempt sanction, not for the crimes alleged in counts one and eleven of th e 1993 indictment against appellant. See United States v. Woods, 127 F.3d 990, 9 9 2 (11th Cir. 1997) ("a prosecution and conviction for criminal contempt is p u n ish m en t for the conduct constituting contempt of court, not for any underlying crim e"). Further, the injunction's requirements are within the scope of authority g iv en to district courts. This injunction does not cut off access to the courts; ap p ellan t has the right to file pleadings in other cases, and may also file additional pleadings in this case if he permitted by this court or the Supreme Court. Given th a t he completed his sentences almost five years ago, and has filed more than fo rty pleadings and fifteen appeals since then, he has already had the opportunity fu lly to litigate the validity of his convictions and sentences. Finally, as he is no lo n g er being punished for the crimes to which he was adjudged guilty, the claims h e raises are moot for there is nothing a court could do to provide relief.

The challenged district court order is, accordingly, A F F IR M E D .

1 Appellant filed a total of 61 documents seeking collateral relief.