[D O NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

F O R THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED

U .S . COURT OF APPEALS

E L E V E N T H CIRCUIT

November 2, 2006

N o . 06-11563 T H O M A S K. KAHN

N o n - A r g u m e n t Calendar CLERK

D . C. Docket No. 05-60219-CR-KAM

U N IT E D STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RICHARD OWEN BROWN,

a.k.a. Dwight Wynter,

Defendant-Appellant.

A p p e al from the United States District Court

fo r the Southern District of Florida

(N o v em b er 2, 2006)

B efo re TJOFLAT, DUBINA and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

P E R CURIAM:

A p p ellan t Richard Owen Brown appeals his conviction for conspiracy to

im p o rt cocaine, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, and attempt to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21U.S.C. §§ 963 and 8 4 6 . On appeal, Brown argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to s u p p r es s physical evidence seized from his girlfriend's car because the police la ck e d probable cause to search the car. Brown further argues that the police e x c ee d e d the scope of a valid inventory search when they read the contents of a d o cu m en t found in the car, thus converting it into an investigatory search.

"A district court's ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question o f law and fact. This Court reviews the district court's finding of facts under the clearly erroneous standard. The district court's application of the law to those facts is subject to de novo review." United States v. Zapata, 180 F.3d 1237, 1240 (11th C ir. 1999) (citations omitted). "Further, when considering a ruling on a motion to su p p ress, all facts are construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party b e lo w ." United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000).

A party moving to suppress evidence must first show that he has standing, co n sistin g of "a legitimate expectation of privacy" in the car being searched.

United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 548 (11th Cir. 1987). On appeal, the g o v ern m en t does not dispute that Brown has standing to challenge the search of the car at issue, even though his girlfriend owned it. Furthermore, the record reflects th a t Brown had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car because Brown had p erm issio n to drive it. See United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 548 (11th Cir. 1 9 8 7 ) (holding that a driver of a borrowed car had a legitimate expectation of p r iv a c y in it, and thus, had standing to challenge a search of the car).

In most circumstances, unless there is consent, police officers must obtain a w arran t supported by probable cause to justify a search under the Fourth A m en d m en t. United States v. Magluta, 418 F.3d 1166, 1182 (11th Cir. 2005), c er t. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2966 (2006). There are, however, several exceptions to th is rule, including "the automobile exception," which allows "officers [to] search an y container in an operational car without a warrant as long as they have probable c au s e to believe that the container holds evidence of a crime." Id. (citing C a lifo rn ia v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579-80, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1991, 114 L. Ed. 2d 6 1 9 (1991)). "Probable cause for a search exists when under the totality of the circu m stan ces there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will b e found in a particular place." Id. (quotations and citations omitted). "In ex am in in g the totality of the circumstances, a reviewing court must give due w e ig h t to the officer's experience." United States v. Briggman, 931 F.2d 705, 709 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1991).

F u r th e r m o r e , inventory searches, in accordance with reasonable police p o licy, are also permissible. Colorado v. Bertine 479 U.S. 367, 374, 107 S. Ct.

7 3 8 , 742, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1987). An inventory search permits a thorough search o f property lawfully in police custody, as long as that search is consistent with the p o lice caretaking function. United States v. O'Bryant, 775 F.2d 1528, 1534 (11th C ir. 1985). Probable cause is not required to conduct a valid inventory search.

Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2608, 77 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1 9 8 3 ). In this context, "the legitimacy of the search . . . turns on its r ea so n a b le n e ss in light of the community caretaking functions that allow inventory search es. . . . [T]he reasonableness of the inventory search depends on the p a r tic u la r facts and circumstances." United States v. Laing, 708 F.2d 1568, 1571 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1983). We have held that "the mere expectation of uncovering evidence w ill not vitiate an otherwise valid inventory search." United States v. Roberson, 8 9 7 F.2d 1092, 1096 (11th Cir. 1990) (quotation and citation omitted).

Based on the totality of the evidence known at the time, we conclude from th e record that authorities had a reasonable belief that Brown used the car to facilitate the drug transaction and a reasonable belief that they would find drugs or o th er evidence of criminal activity inside the car. Thus, authorities had probable cau se to search the car and the search was permissible under the "automobile ex cep tio n " to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. See Magluta, 418 F .3 d at 1182-83. We do not address whether authorities exceeded the scope of a v alid inventory search by reading the contents of the seized documents because the w arran tless search of Carlita's car was otherwise supported by probable cause, and th u s, the district court did not err in denying Brown's motion to suppress.

Accordingly, we affirm Brown's conviction.

A F F IR M E D .