[D O NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FILED

F O R THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

APRIL 28, 2006

THOMAS K. KAHN

N o . 05-16056

CLERK

N o n - A r g u m e n t Calendar

D . C. Docket No. 02-00318-CV-T-17-MSS

U N IT E D STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

3402 53RD STREET WEST,

BRADENTON, FL., Real

property, including all

improvements thereon and

appurtenances thereto, et al.,

Defendants,

JAMES T. SLATE,

Claimant-Appellant,

A p p e al from the United States District Court

fo r the Middle District of Florida

(April 28, 2006)

B efo re BARKETT, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

P E R CURIAM: Jam es T. Slate appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in fav o r of the government in an in rem civil forfeiture proceeding brought pursuant to 21U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) against real property located at 3402 53rd Street, B rad en to n , Florida. On appeal, Slate argues that the government failed to e sta b lis h , by a preponderance of the evidence, that a substantial connection existed b etw een the property forfeited and his criminal activity, the sale of illegal drugs.

For the following reasons, we affirm.

I n granting summary judgment, the district court relied heavily on a sworn affid av it submitted by Justin C. Duralia, special agent with the Drug Enforcement A d m in istratio n ("DEA"). Duralia's affidavit stated that he had learned from a c o n f id e n tia l source ("CS") that Slate had engaged in drug trafficking, and that S la te had sold cocaine to the CS at least fifty times since 1995. The CS claimed th at Slate had distributed approximately sixty ounces of cocaine every two-weeks fro m his residence. Moreover, the CS had seen Slate "process[] powder cocaine in to crack cocaine" in his residence ten to twenty times between 1995 and 1996.

B as ed on the CS's allegations, the DEA directed the CS to return to Slates's resid en ce at 3402 53rd Street West, Bradenton, Florida to purchase cocaine on two o c c as io n s . During the first sale, the CS claimed to have seen at least sixteen o u n c e s of cocaine and a bag of marijuana. During the second sale, the CS claimed to have seen about two pounds of marijuana. Two days after the second sale, DEA ag en ts and local officers executed a search warrant at 3402 53rd Street and found 3 9 5 grams of cocaine and two pounds of marijuana. Slate was arrested thereafter.

In his affidavit, Duralia claims that Slate stated in a post-Miranda interview that the d ru g s seized from his residence belonged to him and that he sold illegal narcotics.

Following a plea of nolo contendere, Slate was judged guilty of seven counts of s ale and possession of cocaine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia, and was s en te n c ed to concurrent terms of one year and one day imprisonment. Thereafter th e government filed a complaint for forfeiture in rem against the property at 3402 5 3 rd Street.

W e review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo.

Levinson v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 245 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2001).

In civil forfeiture proceedings, "summary judgment will be granted against a party w h o fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essen tial to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Specifically, once the m o v in g party, in this case the government, discharges its initial burden of showing an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case, the non-moving p a r ty , Slate, must specify facts proving the existence of a genuine issue of material fact relying upon affidavits, "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and ad m issio n s on file." Id. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56) (internal quotation m ark s omitted). All reasonable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving p a r ty 's , Slate's, favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

P ro p erty is subject to civil forfeiture when it was "used, or intended to be u sed , in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of" a drug traffick in g offense that is "punishable by more than one year's imprisonment." 21 U .S .C . § 881(a)(7). To obtain civil forfeiture, the government must establish by a p rep o n d eran ce of evidence "a substantial connection between the property and the o ffen se." 18U.S.C. § 983(c)(1) and (3). The government "may use both circu m stan tial evidence and hearsay," and the district court should evaluate the e v id e n c e presented with "a common sense view to the realities of normal life." United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1440 (11th Cir. 1 9 9 1 ) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

S late argues that forfeiture is inappropriate in the instant case because the g o v ern m en t failed to establish a substantial connection between the property and th e crime committed. He also claims that the district court improperly relied on D u ralia's affidavit because it was hearsay and it states that the CS purchased drugs fro m Slate more than fifty times since 1995, but Slate did not own the property in q u estio n until 1998.

W e find that the district court did not err in ruling that there was a su b stan tial connection between the property and the offenses. We have previously f o u n d that one drug sale negotiated and one drug sale completed at a residence was su fficien t to demonstrate a substantial connection between the residence and the d ru g trafficking offense for purposes of forfeiture. United States v. Cleckler, 270 F .3 d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2001) (applying pre-CAFRA burden of probable cau se). Here, Slate was adjudicated guilty of numerous state violations relating to th e drugs found during the seizure. Moreover, approximately 395 grams of co cain e and two pounds of marijuana were seized from the property subject to fo rfeitu re and Slate admitted in a post-arrest statement that the drugs seized from h is residence belonged to him and that he sold illegal narcotics. Accordingly, the reco rd supports the district court's determination that there was no genuine issue of m aterial fact that would have negated the showing of a substantial connection b etw een the property and the offense, and that the district court did not err in g ran tin g the government's motion for summary judgment. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552; Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d at 1438-39.1 A s to Slate's challenge to Duralia's affidavit on hearsay grounds, we hold th at there was no error to the extent that the district court based its determination o n Duralia's affidavit that recounted allegations by the CS. Even if the statements w e re hearsay, the court was entitled to consider them. See Four Parcels of Real P ro p erty, 941 F.2d at 1440.

A F F IR M E D .

1 Because the sale and seizure of drugs and Slate's post-Miranda admissions occurred after Slate assumed ownership of the property, we deny his claim that the district court improperly relied on facts occurring before he assumed ownership.