[D O NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FILED

F O R THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

AUG 18, 2006

THOMAS K. KAHN

N o . 05-16149

CLERK

N o n - A r g u m e n t Calendar

D . C. Docket No. 05-14024-CR-KMM

U N IT E D STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

TIMOTHY TRENT CAMPBELL,

Defendant-Appellant.

A p p e al from the United States District Court

fo r the Southern District of Florida

(A u g u st 18, 2006)

B efo re MARCUS, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

P E R CURIAM:

T im o th y Trent Campbell appeals his conviction for receiving child

p o rn o g rap h y and challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence.

Campbell argues that the evidence was seized based on an invalid warrant. We a f f ir m .

I. BACKGROUND O n September 20, 2004, Campbell initiated an instant messaging text chat w ith Mitch Nixon, an undercover detective with the Gainesville, Florida, police d ep artm en t. Nixon posed as the father of a 14-year-old girl in a chat room freq u en ted by individuals interested in having sex with minors and trading child p o rn o g rap h y. Campbell bragged to Nixon that he had sex with his own minor d au g h ter and arranged to meet Nixon and Nixon's daughter in Ocala, Florida, for th e purpose of having a sexual encounter with Nixon's daughter. Campbell can celled the arranged meeting ostensibly due to time constraints.

N ix o n forwarded the information regarding his conversations with Campbell to Neal Spector, a detective on a child exploitation task force with the St. Lucie C o u n ty Sheriff's Office. On January 3, 2005, Spector observed Campbell in the s am e chat room through which Campbell had contacted Nixon. Spector posed as th e father of an 11-year-old girl and contacted Campbell through an instant m essag in g text. In his conversation with Spector, Campbell stated that he had a d a u g h te r who lived with her mother out-of-town, he had been sexually involved w ith his daughter, and he liked girls aged "10 and up." He also sent Spector a p h o to g r ap h of a nude woman with her face hidden. When Spector inquired w h eth er Campbell had "ever experienced young," Campbell responded in the n e g a tiv e because he had "bailed" on the Ocala rendezvous when "it didn't feel rig h t." When asked if he had preteen images, Campbell stated it would take him a w h ile to find them because he hid them. On January 14, 2005, Campbell stated th at he would like to engage in oral sex with Spector's 11-year-old daughter and s ta te d that the pictures he had previously sent were of Campbell's own daughter.

D etectiv e Brian Broughton of the Martin County Sheriff's Office applied to state court for a warrant to search Campbell's residence and computer for v io la tio n s of state law regarding sexual battery of a minor, solicitation, and sexual p erfo rm an ce by a child. Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 794.001(2)(a), 777.04, 827.071.

Broughton attached an affidavit that included a detailed summary of the co n v ersatio n s between Nixon and Spector and Campbell. The warrant application s ta te d that the conversations established probable cause that a computer was lo c a te d in Campbell's residence that was involved in the criminal attempt to induce a child under the age of 12 to commit a criminal offense. Broughton executed the w a rr an t and seized several computers from Campbell's residence that contained im ag es of child pornography. C am p b ell was charged in federal court in a superseding information with receiv in g child pornography, 18U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), and possessing child p o rn o g rap h y, id. § 2252(a)(4)(B). Before trial, Campbell moved to suppress ev id en ce obtained from his residence based on the state search warrant on the g r o u n d that the warrant application lacked probable cause. The district court d en ied the motion. Campbell then entered a conditional plea of guilt to the charge o f receiving child pornography.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW W e review de novo the determination of the district court that an affidavit e sta b lis h e d probable cause, but we "take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers." United States v. J im in e z , 224 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION C am p b ell raises two arguments regarding the denial of his motion to su p p ress. First, Campbell argues that the facts stated in the affidavit attached to the w arran t application were insufficient to establish probable cause. Second, C am p b ell argues that the veracity of the affidavit submitted in support of the w arran t application is questionable. We address each argument in turn. A . The Warrant Application Contained Sufficient Facts to Establish P r o b a b le Cause.

C am p b ell argues that the warrant application does not allege facts sufficient to establish each of the elements of the crimes listed in the warrant application. He also argues that the facts were insufficient to establish probable cause for so licitatio n to commit sexual battery, Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 794.011, 777.04, because h e clearly abandoned his attempt to commit the crime. Campbell's arguments fail.

T h e warrant application established probable cause to search for evidence of c h ild pornography possessed by Campbell. Id. § 827.071. Campbell e-mailed p h o to g rap h s of a nude female that Campbell told Spector was Campbell's minor d au g h ter. When asked if he had any "preteen images", Campbell replied that "it w o u ld take a while to find, I hide them." These facts establish probable cause to search Campbell's residence and his computer for images of child pornography.

T h e warrant application also established probable cause to search for ev id en ce of solicitation to commit sexual battery. Id. §§ 794.011, 777.04.

Campbell bragged to both detectives that he had sex with his own minor daughter, a n d Campbell sent Spector photographs of a nude female that Campbell alleged w as his daughter. Campbell arranged with Nixon to meet Nixon's daughter and h av e sex with her. Campbell asked if Spector had ever "shared" his daughter and s ta te d in explicit details a desire to have sex with Spector's daughter. When asked w h at ages he liked, Campbell responded "10 and up." These facts establish p ro b ab le cause to search for evidence that Campbell had engaged in solicitation of a minor to commit sexual battery.

Campbell's other argument also fails. Although the defense of abandonment m ay be a sufficient defense against conviction, it does not eliminate the probability th at Campbell used his computer to solicit a minor to commit sexual battery.

Campbell confuses the standard for conviction, beyond reasonable doubt, with the s ta n d a r d for a valid warrant, probable cause. "Although probable cause requires m o re than suspicion, it does not require convincing proof, and need not reach the [ sa m e ] standard of conclusiveness and probability as the facts necessary to support a conviction." Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1195 (11th Cir. 2002).

It is also unclear whether Campbell voluntarily abandoned his attempt to so licit a minor. Campbell stated that he did not meet with Nixon and Nixon's d au g h ter because "it didn't feel right." It is unclear whether Campbell decided not to meet with Nixon because he understood that sexual battery of a minor was w ro n g or because he was afraid of a sting operation. The latter explanation is b o lstered by Campbell's later expression of his desire to engage in sexual activity w ith Spector's 11-year-old daughter. B . The Veracity of the Affidavit in Support of the Warrant Application Is Not in Doubt.

C am p b ell argues that the veracity of the affidavit is doubtful because B ro u g h to n knowingly or recklessly misrepresented or omitted facts and Broughton d id not observe any of the facts first hand. As to the first argument, Campbell erro n eo u sly alleges that Broughton knowingly or recklessly failed to state in the affid av it that Campbell did not actually have a daughter. To challenge the veracity o f the affidavit, Campbell had to make specific allegations of knowing or reckless falseh o o d and an offer of proof to support the allegations. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U .S . 154, 171, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2684 (1978). Campbell made no offer of proof and h as nothing more than his own unsupported allegations that Broughton knowingly o r recklessly failed to state that Campbell did not have a daughter.

C am p b ell's other argument that Broughton did not observe any of the facts first hand and based the affidavit on the statements of Nixon and Spector also fails.

"Observations of fellow officers of the Government engaged in a common in v estig atio n are plainly a reliable source for a warrant applied for by one of their n u m b er." United States v. Kirk, 781 F.2d 1498, 1505 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting U n ited States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111, 85 S. Ct. 741, 747 (1965)).

Campbell cites to no case law that requires a police officer to verify independently f ac ts related to him by other police officers before including the facts in an affid av it in support of a warrant.

IV. CONCLUSION C am p b ell's conviction is A F F IR M E D .