[D O NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FILED

F O R THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

OCT 27, 2006

THOMAS K. KAHN

N o . 06-12659

CLERK

N o n - A r g u m e n t Calendar

D . C. Docket No. 05-14094-CR-DLG

U N IT E D STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

WILLIE JAMES ROBINSON, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

A p p e al from the United States District Court

fo r the Southern District of Florida

(O cto b er 27, 2006)

B efo re TJOFLAT, DUBINA and HULL, Circuit Judges.

P E R CURIAM:

A p p ellan t Willie James Robinson ("Robinson") appeals his conviction for

k n o w in g ly and intentionally possessing with intent to distribute five grams or more o f cocaine base, in violation of 21U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). On appeal, R o b in so n argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress ev id en ce obtained pursuant to a search warrant because the affidavit submitted by p o lice to obtain the search warrant did not establish probable cause, and he also co n ten d s the good faith exception to the search warrant requirement does not a p p ly .

We review the district court's determination of whether an affidavit estab lish ed probable cause de novo, and review the district court's findings of fact fo r clear error. United States v. Jiminez, 224 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000).

We give "great deference" to a district court's determination of probable cause.

United States v. Brundidge, 170 F.3d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation o m itted ). We also review de novo whether the good faith exception to the e x c lu s io n a ry rule applies to a search, reviewing findings of fact for clear error.

U n ited States v. Robinson, 336 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003).

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, "no Warrants sh all issue, but upon probable cause . . . " U.S. Const. Amend. IV, The U.S.

S u p rem e Court has noted that probable cause is a "fluid concept ­ turning on the a ss es sm e n t of probabilities in particular factual contexts ­ not readily, or even u s e fu lly , reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 1 0 3 S. Ct. 2317, 2329, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983). To establish probable cause, an affid av it submitted to obtain a search warrant must state facts that are "`sufficient to justify a conclusion that evidence or contraband will probably be found at the p r e m is es to be searched.'" United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2 0 0 2 ) (citation omitted). Because the warrant application typically focuses on w h eth er the suspect committed a crime and whether evidence of the crime will be fo u n d at his home or business, we have held that the affidavit must contain "`su fficien t information to conclude that a fair probability existed that seizable e v id e n c e would be found in the place sought to be searched.'" Martin, 297 F.3d at 1 3 1 4 (citation omitted). Where an informant is mentioned in the affidavit, the affid av it also must demonstrate the informant's "veracity" and "basis of k n o w le d g e ." Id.

In Gates, the Supreme Court rejected a two-pronged analysis that separately a n a ly ze d an informant's veracity and basis of knowledge, in favor of a totality-ofth e-circu m stan ces analysis, where "a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in d eterm in in g the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing in the other, or by s o m e other indicia of reliability." Gates, 462 U.S. at 233, 103 S. Ct. at 2329. We h av e held that independent police corroboration of a confidential informant's statem en t is not a requirement in every case. Brundidge, 170 F.3d at 1353. "An `ex p licit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement th at the event was observed firsthand, entitles the [confidential informant's] tip to g re ater weight than might otherwise be the case."' Id. (citation omitted). Thus, we h a v e upheld the validity of the probable cause affidavit where the confidential in fo rm an t had provided information that had proven to be truthful and reliable in th e past and where the level of detail showed that the informant was unlikely to lie b ecau se the lies would be discovered in short order, Brundidge, 170 F.3d at 13535 4 ; where police were able to independently confirm some of the facts that the in fo rm an t provided, Martin, 297 F.3d at 1315; United States v. Talley, 108 F.3d 2 7 7 , 281(11th Cir. 1997); and where the confidential informant made a statement ag ain st his or her penal interest to the officer, United States v. Farese, 612 F.2d 1 3 7 6 , 1378 (5th Cir. 1980).

The Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement contains a good faith ex cep tio n , and evidence should not be suppressed where it was obtained by "o b je ctiv e ly reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3420, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677.

"[A] warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish that a law e n f o r c em e n t officer has acted in good faith in conducting the search." Id. at 922, 1 0 4 S. Ct. at 3420 (internal quotation omitted). However, the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement does not apply where (1) the magistrate or judge in is su in g a warrant "was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew w as false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the tru th ," (2) the issuing magistrate "wholly abandoned his judicial role,"or (3) the affid av it was "`so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable."' Id. at 923, 104 S. Ct. at 3421 (citation o m itte d ) .

Here, the totality of the circumstances indicate there was probable cause to issu e the search warrant. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 233, 103 S. Ct. at 2329. After p o lice discovered crack cocaine in James Hargray's vehicle, Hargray agreed to tell p o lic e where he had obtained the drugs. Detectives included this information in an a ff id a v it used for obtaining the search warrant. The affidavit contained in fo rm atio n that indicated Hargray was unlikely to lie because detectives could d isco v er if he was lying in short order. See Brundidge, 170 F.3d at 1353-54.

Hargray provided specific details about where and when he had obtained the co cain e. Hargray's description of Robinson's house was corroborated when two d e te ctiv e s accompanied Hargray to Robinson's home to verify the structure, o c c u p a n ts , and vehicles parked in the driveway. The affidavit also indicated that H arg ray's statements were reliable because he had implicated himself in a co n sp iracy to possess and distribute cocaine.

Even assuming, arguendo, that the affidavit did not set forth probable cause to issue the warrant, the district court correctly determined that the good faith ex cep tio n to the exclusionary rule from United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.

C t. 3405, applied. The detective who obtained the warrant was neither dishonest n o r reckless in his affidavit for procuring a search, and his belief that probable c au s e existed was objectively reasonable. The detective knew that if Hargray lied to police, he knew any opportunity he may have had for obtaining a "break" would d issip ate rapidly. Also, Hargray provided details regarding his purchase of cocaine at the described location just 20 minutes before the traffic stop. Further, his d e s cr ip tio n s of the location and occupants of the premises to be searched were sp ecific and based on personal observations. Accordingly, we conclude from the reco rd that Robinson has failed to show that the district court erred in denying his m o tio n to suppress evidence. For that reason, we affirm Robinson's conviction.

AFFIRMED.