* P ursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR .

R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-40542 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CARLOS OTERO, a.k.a. CHARLIE, a.k.a. CHARLIE OTERO; JUAN RODRIGUEZ, a.k.a. JOHNNY RODRIGUEZ, a.k.a. JOHNNY; GUSTAVO B. ANDRADE; and AUGUSTIN JAIME OBREGON-GONZALEZ, a.k.a. JAIME OBREGON, Defendants-Appellants, Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas (B-96-CR-337) March 5, 1999 Before KING, Chief Judge, JONES, and SMITH, Circuit Judges: PER CURIAM: * Carlos Otero, Juan Rodriguez, Gustavo Andrade, and Augustin Jaime Obregon-Gonzalez were convicted by a jury on various charges relating to the importation and possession of marijuana.

On appeal, the appellants have raised numerous issues in connection with their convictions. Finding no error in the pretrial, trial, or sentencing proceedings, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY A. The Conspiracy In August 1996, the appellants contacted a confidential informant for the United States Customs Service to arrange for the transportation of marijuana between the Rio Grande Valley of Texas and Chicago, Illinois. After agreeing with Andrade and Hilario Obregon to transport the marijuana for $50,000, the informant scheduled an appropriate date to pick up the shipment.

From August 29 to September 2 , 1996, the informant, an undercover officer, and the appellants worked to gather, load, and store the marijuana shipment. On August 29, Obregon-Gonzales and Obregon assisted the informant in loading marijuana into a van (“the August 29 load”). 1 On August 30, the undercover officer drove the van to Rodriguez’s grocery store where he met ObregonGonzales, Andrade, and Rodriguez. More marijuana was loaded in the van (“the August 30 load”), and the undercover officer was given money orders in the amount of $5,350 a down payment on the $50,000. On August 31, the undercover officer met with ObregonGonzales, Andrade, and Rodriguez to receive the final shipment of marijuana. To their chagrin, the United States Border Patrol seized this shipment as it was crossing the border from Mexico.

On September 2, Andrade, Obregon, and Obregon-Gonzales met with the undercover officer at a warehouse where the marijuana had been stored. An additional $6,000 was delivered, and the parties argued regarding the total amount of marijuana included in the shipment. Later that day, the undercover officer met with Andrade, received an additional $3,000 in money orders, and finalized plans for transporting the marijuana, including instructions for delivering the contraband to “Charlie” in Chicago.

Following the transportation of the marijuana to Chicago, the undercove r officer contacted Charlie, a.k.a. Otero. The undercover officer discussed delivery arrangements with Otero and Andrade, who had been accompanied to Chicago by Obregon-Gonzales.

Final payment was arranged through the informant by wiring $25,000 from Mexico to a bank in Brownsville, Texas. After the informant con firmed receipt of the money on September 9, the undercover officer delivered the marijuana to Andrade and Otero at a hotel.

Andrade and Otero left with the marijuana in a Ryder truck. An Illinois state trooper working with the Customs Service stopped the vehicle. When searched, the marijuana was found in the cargo bay. B.

The Indictment and Convictions Rodriguez, Andrade, Otero, Obregon-Gonzales, and Obregon 2 were indicted by a federal grand jury for conspiracy to import in excess of 100 kilograms of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(b)(2), 963; conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute in excess of 100 kilograms of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), 846; and conspiracy t o launder money, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). Rodriguez, Andrade, Obregon-Gonzales, and Obregon were also charged with possession, and aiding and abetting possession, with intent to distribute in excess of 100 kilograms of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The defendants were tried together. Otero filed a motion to sever, which the trial court denied. RodriguezÂ’s oral motion for severance, made during pretrial proceedings, was also denied.

Neither the record nor trial tr anscripts indicate that Andrade filed a pretrial motion to sever. The appellants timely appealed their convictions.

II. ANALYSIS 3 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence V iewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence wa s sufficient to support the convictions of ObregonGonzalez, Otero, and Rodriguez for conspiracy to import marijuana, conspiracy to possess wit h intent to distribute marijuana, and possession with intent to distribute marijuana. S ee United States v. Sanchez , 961 F.2d 1169, 1173 (5th Cir. 1992) (explaining standard for sufficiency of evidence re view). In fact, factual support for the convictions is sprinkled liberally throughout the record.

First, the sole basis for Obregon-Gonzalez’s sufficiency challenge (i.e., that he lacked the requisite intent because he was acting as an agent of the government) was heard by the jury and rejected. We will not upset this credibility determination on appeal. See United States v. Kelley , 140 F.3d 596, 607 (5th Cir. 1998) (“We will not supplant the jury ’s determination of credibility with that of our own.” (internal punctuation omitted)).

The actions of Otero and Rodriguez, with respect to the narcotics conspiracies, showed a clear concert of action from which a jury could infer the existence of a conspiracy for each count.

See United States v. Card enas , 9 F.3d 1139, 1157 (5th Cir. 1993) (“An agr eement to violate narcotics laws may be inferred from ‘concert of action.’”). Direct and circumstantial evidence linked each of the appellants to the entire conspiracy from the importation stage, 4 to the loading of the drugs, 5 to delivery of the drugs to Ch icago, 6 and to payment and transportation following delivery. Under these circumstances a jury could have readily found that each of the appellants conspired to import marijuana from Mexico and then conspired to possess the drug with intent to d i stribute. This evidence likewise supported the appellants’ convictions for possession with intent to distribute.

The conspiracy to launder money requires a more detailed analysis, however. In its brief, the government has argued that Rodriguez§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), an individual must enter into an agreement whose ultimate purpose is to “promote the carrying on of specified unlawful a ctivity” by conducting a financial transa ction using property which involves the known proceeds of specified unlawful activity. 7 Clearly, the mere agreement to pay the informant and undercove r officer would not constitute a conspiracy to launder mon ey absent proof that the conspirators contemplated that the “proceeds” used to conduct the tran saction would be derived from unlawful activity. In fact, Rodriguez attempts to make this very argument in his brief.

RodriguezÂ’s conviction for conspiring to launder money rests, however, on sufficient proof on a narrower basis. The evidence submi tted to the jury demonstrated that the appellants were engaged in a broad conspiracy to import marijuana from Mexico to Chicago. In order to promote the narcotics conspiracy, the appellants engaged the services of the informant and the undercover officer to transport the marijuana from Texas to Illinois. To pay for these ser vices, the appellants purchased money orders in Chicago and wired funds from Mexico to Brownsville, Texas. As the governme nt explained at oral argument and in its closing jury argument, a jury could find based on circumstantial evidence that the appellants had use d the proceeds of unlawful activities occurring in Chicago and Mexico (i.e., funds procured through participation in felony narcotics violations) to promote an unlawful activity (i.e., conspiring to import and dis tribute marijuana) by conducting a financial transaction (i.e., purchasing money orders and wiring funds). Rodriguez knowingly participated in a conspiracy that included money laundering to further the defendantsÂ’ importation scheme. See United States v. Garcia Abrego , 141 F.3d 142, 163 (5th Cir. 1998) (defining elements of money lau ndering conspiracy) (citing U nited States v. Conley , 37 F.3d 970, 976-77 (3d Cir. 1994)).

B. Motions to Sever This court reviews the denial of a motion to sever for an abuse of discretion. S ee United States v. Neal , 27 F.3d 1035, 1045 (5th Cir. 1994). In conducting this examination, the court must Otero maintained that Andrade would waive his Fifth Amendment rights at OteroÂ’s severed trial and would testify that Otero had no knowledge of the conspiracy. During the pretrial conference, however, Andrade confirmed that he would not waive his Fifth Amendment rights. Based on this refusal, the trial court den ied OteroÂ’s motion to sever. Nonetheless, the district court admitted a statement into evidence, allegedly written by Under all of these circumstances, Rodriguez waived the se verance grounds he now asserts. See United States v. Brown , 16 F.3d 423, 428-29 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding waiver of Rule 8 relief when appellant failed to assert the issue pretrial, though proper Rule 14 motion had been made).

C. Motion to Suppress A federal agent may not prosecute a defendant by using evidence obtained by stat e officers in violation of the federal Constitution. See Elkins v. United States , 364 U.S. 206, 223-24, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 1447 (1960) (rejecting “silver platter” doctrine); see also United States v. Eastland , 989 F.2d 760, 765-66 (5th Cir. 1993). In E astland , this court refused to extend the Elkins principle to evidence obtained in violation of a state statute or constitution, so long as the seizure did not violate the Constitution. S ee Eastland , 989 F.2d at 765-66. Under the Fourth Amendment, a conversation may be recorded as long as one party to the conversation has consented to the taping. S ee United States v. White , 401 U.S. 745, 749, 91 S. Ct. 1122, 1125 (1971); U nited States v. Gorel , 622 F.2d 100, 106 (5th Cir. 1979). The recordings in this case were each made with the consent of a participant, the undercover officer or the informant, and, thus, did not violate the Constitution. 10 Accordingly, the trial court did not err by admitting the tapes or by refusing to instruct the jury on inapplicable Illinois law. See Eastland , 989 F.2d at 765-66.

D. Admission of AndradeÂ’s Address Books The admission of AndradeÂ’s address books is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. S ee United States v. Brito , 136 F.3d 397, 412 (5th Cir. 1998). AndradeÂ’s counsel objected to the admission of the addres s books for lack of foundation and hearsay. In response to the objections, the trial court asked the Illinois state trooper when and where the evidence had been seized. The officer r esponded that the address books were taken from Andrade when he was arrested. Thus, the trial court could have concluded, based on the seiz ure of the address books from Andrade, that the books were his property and that the writing therein was his. Under these circumstances, the address books were properly admissible under the exception to the hearsay rule for admissions of a party opponent. S ee Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). Even if the address books were not ad missible, the ruling would amount to harmless error, as substantial record evidence of AndradeÂ’s guilt existed without the address books. See United States v. Gadison , 8 F.3d 186, 192 (5th Cir. 1993).

E. Improper Comments During Closing Argument During the governmentÂ’s closing argument, a prosecutor commented on an objection AndradeÂ’s attorney had made to the admission of a police report. Andrade objected to the statement.

The objection was overruled and counsel’s request to instruct the jury that the prosecutor’s remark constituted an attack on the office of defense counsel was denied. The district court, however, did admonish the jurors, “Remember my instructions. You are to consider the evidence that has been admitted during the course of the trial. That’s a legal matter before me.” Based on the trial court’s curative instruction, the limited prejudicial effect the lone statement may have had on the jury, and the substantial evidence of Andrade’s guilt, the trial court’s decision not to offer a more detailed curative instruction and not to grant a mistrial does not cast serious doubt on the jury’s verdict. S ee United States v. Andrews , 22 F.3d 1328, 1341 (5th Cir. 1994) (reversing verdic t only proper when prosecutor’s remarks “cast serious doubts on the correctness of the jury’s verdict”); see also United States v. Anchondo-Sandoval , 910 F.2d 1234, 1237 (5th Cir. 1990) (setting forth factors to be considered).

F. The Jury Instructions Andrade maintains that a more specific perjury instruction should have b een given in light of the undercover officerÂ’s testimony that it would be acceptable to deceive in order to garner a c onviction. S ee , e.g. , United States v. Partin , 493 F.2d 750, 760-62 (5th Cir. 1974) (requiring specific perjury instruction when evid ence showed that witnesses essential to the governmentÂ’s case were convicted felons and admitted perj urers).

The trial courtÂ’s admonitions to the jury appropriately instructed the jurors as to their role in we ighing the credibility of a witnessÂ’s testimony, and the instruct ions correctly informed the jury that it could believe any or all of a witnessÂ’s testimony.

AndradeÂ’s argument, moreover, borders on the frivolous.

The undercover of ficer in this case was not a felon or perjurer.

In fact, his remarks concerning the propriety of deception arose in the context of several questions about his role in the undercover operation, not with respect to his testimony. The trial courtÂ’s substantively correct charge to the jury did not deprive Andrade of any defense or argument, and thus, the trial court did not err in rejecting AndradeÂ’s proffered instructions. See United States v. Pipkin , 114 F.3d 528, 535 (5th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Asibor , 109 F.3d 1023, 1034 (5th Cir. 1997).

Next, Andrade challenges the trial courtÂ’s alleged failure to instruct the jury that a mere buyer/seller relationship was insufficient to support a conspiracy conviction and the courtÂ’s refusal to give the jurors a copy of the written charge for use during deliberations. So long as the general conspiracy charge accurately reflects the law, this court does not require a specific instruction regarding the insufficiency of a buyer/seller rel ationship. S ee Asibor , 109 F.3d at 1034-35 (citing United States v. Mas eratti , 1 F.3d 330, 336 (5th Cir. 1993)). As such, the trial court did not err by refusing to give the proffered instruction. Moreover, the court did not abuse its discretion by f ailing to give a written copy of the charge to jurors for use during deliberations. C f. United States v. Sotelo , 97 F.3d 782, 787-88, 792-93 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding trial court did not abuse discretion by refusing to give jurors a copy of written charge in multi-defendant, multi-charge drug conspiracy indictment).

G. Sentencing 1. Rodriguez Rodriguez maintains that the district court committed clear error at sentencing by attributing 1,200 pounds of marijuana to the conspiracy. S ee United States v. Carre on , 11 F.3d 1225, 1230, 1231 n.17 (5th Cir. 1994) (factual findings regardi ng drug amounts reviewed for clear error). Although Rodriguez argues that o nly the August 30 load of marijuana should be attributed to him for sentencing purposes, the testimony of the confidential informant clearly shows that R odriguezÂ’s involvement in the conspiracy extended to the August 29 load the initial delivery point for the August 29 load was RodriguezÂ’s grocery store.

Moreover, Rodriguez§ 3B1.1(c) is also subject to clear error review. S ee United States v. Rivas , 99 F.3d 170, 176 (5th Cir. 1996). Andrade negotiated a price for the transport, developed plans for loading an d delivering the marijuana, paid deposits on the $50,000 fee, and, ultimately, accepted delivery of t he marijuana in Chicago.

Based on his dominant position in the conspiracy at every stage of the crime, the trial courtÂ’s two point adjustment of AndradeÂ’s sentence level did not constitute clear error.

III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, this court affirms the convictions and sentences of each of the appellants.

AFFIRMED .

1 Initially, the parties had planned to pick up the August 29 load at RodriguezÂ’s grocery store. These plans ultimately fell through, however, and the August 29 load was stowed on board the van at a house in El Ranchito, Texas

2 Obrego n was indicted with the appellants; however, he died prior to trial

3 In some cases, more than one of the appellants raises the arguments we address. It is unnecessary, however, to specify the proponent of each of t he issues, and we will respond to their arguments together

4 A portion of the drugs intended to be loaded at RodriguezÂ’s g rocery store was seized by the Border Patrol. Moreover, on September 2, 1996, Andrade discussed the extent of the conspiracyÂ’s operation in Mexico with the undercover officer. 5 Most of the loading was accomplished, or was meant to be accomplished, at RodriguezÂ’s grocery store. This evidence not only supports the appellantsÂ’ conspiracy convictions, but it buttresses RodriguezÂ’s conviction for possession of the August 29 load with intent to distribute. Though the original plan to transfer the August 29 load at the grocery store failed, RodriguezÂ’s attachment to this load was revealed when Obregon-Gonzalez told the undercover officer that Johnny, a.k.a. Rodriguez, calculated the entire load at 1300 pounds of marijuana, the approximate total of both the August 29 and 30 loads. 6 Otero was clearly linked to each of the narcotics conspiracies, including the conspiracy to import, as the Chicago contact for the undercover officer

7 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) defines the crime of money laundering in the following fashion, Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts . . . a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity . . . . 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) makes a conspiracy to commit an offense under § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) a crime

8 Otero asserts in a footnote to his brief that severance was also warranted to avoid presenting a case too factually and legally complex for a jury to comprehend. The evidence presented, however, wa s similar to that in any multi-defendant, multi-count drug conspiracy indictment severance was not required based on alleged complexity

9 The f ollowing perfunctory colloquy appears in pretrial proceedings: 9 Andrade, which proclaimed that Ot ero was not involved in the conspiracy. In this way, Otero was neither deprived of AndradeÂ’s testimony nor denied admission of potentially exculpatory evidence. Otero was not entitled to a separate trial. 2. Rodriguez and Andrade This court will not review the merits of RodriguezÂ’s and AndradeÂ’s arguments. The record excerpts filed by Andrade do not indicate that a motion to sever was filed on his behalf in the trial court. Thus, Andrade waived his right to pursue severance. See United States v. Palmer , 122 F.3d 215, 22 0 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Castillo , 77 F.3d 1480, 1490 n.19 (5th Cir. 1996)). Rodriguez has failed to point out any properly filed motion to sev er in the record, and the docket sheet does not indicate that a written motion to sever was filed, although it identifies the governmentÂ’s response to such a motion. Based on the deficiency in the record, attributable to Rodriguez, we need not consider this issue. See United States v. Hinojosa , 958 F.2d 624, 632-33 (5th Cir. 1992). Moreover, based on the governmentÂ’s trial briefing and the transcripts of pretrial procee dings, it appears that Rodriguez changed the basis for his motion to sever on appeal arguing below that severance of defendants was required under Fed. R. Crim. P. 14, yet maintaining on appeal that severance of of fenses was necessary pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a)

Rodriguez’s Attorney: I have a motion to sever, your honor. [M]y only basis for that is there are three defendants in this case. * * * The Court: It will be prejudicia l is what you are saying? Rodriguez’s Attorney: Yes, your honor . The Court: Any other grounds? Rodriguez’s Attorney: No, your honor. The Court: It will be denied. This exchange indicates that Rodriguez in fact relied on Rule 14 as the basis for his pretrial motion to sever. If this discussion constitutes the sole basis for his motion, Rodriguez failed to proffer sufficient evidence to demonstrate a compelling and specific justification for severance under Rule 14. Accordingly, the record would not support a finding that the trial court abused its discretion. Moreover, plain error review of Rodriguez’s Rule 8(a) argument also fails to persuade the court that severance was required. The charged offenses clearly formed “two or more acts or transactions . . . constituting parts of a common scheme” and, thus, were joined properly in the indictment. Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a)

1 0 It follows from this discussion that we take no position on whether the tape recordings violated Illinois law, as appellants contend