UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 00-20316 (Summary Calendar) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, Defendant - Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, Trustee for Life Choices PTO Defendant - Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, Trustee for Life Center Houston Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court For the Southern District of Texas USDC Nos. H-99-MC-387, H-99-MC-388, H-99-MC-389 March 9, 2001 Before EMILIO M. GARZA, STEWART, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: * John Parks Trowbridge (“Trowbridge”) on behalf of himself and two trusts, Life Choices PTO and Life Center Houston, is appea ling t he district court’s order enforcing three Internal Revenue Service (“I.R.S.”) summonses. We affirm.

Trowbridge presents two arguments on a ppeal: (1) whether the district court erred by enforcing the summonses because the I.R.S. failed to cite to a taxing statute that established a tax liabilit y prior to issuing the summonses; and (2) whether the district court failed to comply with F ED .

R. C IV . P. 52(a) by not issuing adequate findings of fact and legal conclusions.

Before addressing Trowbridge’s arguments, there are two preliminary issues that require our attention. In the government’s brief, the government suggests that there is a potential impediment to our asserting jurisdiction over Trowbridge’s appeal, specifically that it is not clear whether Trowbridge was appealing pursuant to F ED . R. C IV . P. 52(a), or requesting the district court to amend its findings or make additional findings pursuant to F ED . R. C IV . P. 52(b). If Trowbridge appealed pursuant to F ED . R. C IV . P. 52(a), specifically if he was claiming that the district court failed to “find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law,” then we have jurisdiction to review his claim because he filed his notice of appeal within 60 days of the district court’s order. See F ED . R. A PP . P. 4(a)(1)(B). If, however, Trowbridge was requesting amended or additional findings pursuant to F ED . R. C IV . P. 52(b), then we do not have jurisdiction because Trowbridge filed a “Request by Respondent for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law” with the district court within 10 days of the entry of judgment, and, before the district court ruled on the motion, Trowbridge appealed. S ee F ED . R. A PP . P. 4(a)(4)(A)(ii).

After rev iewing Tro wbridge’s request for findings of fact and conclusions of law and his notice of appeal, we hold that Trowbridge was appealing his request pursuant to F E D . R. C IV . P. 52(a). 1 In Trowbridge’s “request” he emphasized that the district court failed to specially state its findings of fact and conclusions of law. 2 Moreover, the cases he cited to in his “request” address the district court’s duty to state its findings of facts and conclusions of law pursuant to F ED . R. C IV . P. 52(a). Accordingly, we find that Trowbridge appealed his “request” pursuant to F E D . R. C IV . P. 52(a), and therefore we retain jurisdiction to decide his appeal.

Secondly, we note that Trowbridge is not an attorney, and did not retain legal counsel. As the district court correctly stated, a non-attorney is not entitled to represent a trust in federal court.

See Row land v. California Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council , 506 U.S. 194, 202, 113 S.Ct. 716, 721, 121 L.Ed.2d 656 (1993) (noting that there exists a “long line of cases” requiring that corporations be represented by counsel when in court, and this “rule applies equally to all artificial entities.”) Furthermore, Trowbridge has not appealed this decision by the district court.

Consequently, Trowbridge may not proffer arguments on behalf of the trusts.

Although Trowbridge raised a series of arguments in the district court for pre venting the enforcement of the summonses, on appeal Trowbridge only claims that the summonses should not have been enforced because the I.R.S. did not cite to a provision of the tax code that established a tax liability for any of the parties summoned. We disagree. Whether the I.R.S. is required to cite t o a t axing statute that establishes a taxpay er’s tax liability before issuing a summons is a question of law that we review de novo . See Chandler , 958 F.2d at 89. The I.R.S. is endowed with the statutory aut ho rit y to “ascertain the tax liability of all persons who may be liable to pay any Internal Revenue tax.” S ee United States v. First Nat’l Bank of Dallas , 635 F.2d 391, 393 (5th Cir. 1981). In order to accomplish this end, the I.R.S. has t he authority to “examine records and witnesses (secured by summonses, if necessary) for the purpose of determining the correctness of returns and liability.” Id .

Moreover, to achieve compliance with its summonses, the I.R.S. may seek enforcement of its summonses by demonstrating to a district court “that [its] investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, that the information sought is not already within the Commissioner’s possession, and that the administrative steps required by the Code have been follow ed.” U nited States v. Powell , 379 U.S. 48, 57-58, 85 S.Ct. 248, 255, 13 L.Ed.2d 112 (1964).

Although the I.R.S. may seek enforcement of the summonses it issues, a taxpayer may prevent enforcement of an I.R.S. summons by “show[ing] that the IRS is attempting to abuse th e court’s process.” B arquero v. United States v. Int’l Bank of Commerce , 18 F.3d 1311, 1317 (5th Cir. 1994) quoting United States v. Stuart , 489 U.S. 353, 109 S.Ct. 1183, 103 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989). Trowbridge claims that enforcing the I.R.S. summonses was an abuse of process because the I.R.S. issued the summonses without citing to a tax provision that established any tax liabilit y on the part of Trowbridge or the trusts. Tro wbridge’s argument is unavailing. As the Supreme Court indicated in Powell , the reason the I.R.S. has been afforded the authority to investigate an individual’s tax liabilit y is to determine whether there has been a deficiency. Accordingly, a requirement that the I.R.S. establish a taxpayer’s liabilit y, by ident ifying a provision of the tax code that imposes liabilit y on the taxpayer, before issuing a summons would thwart the I.R.S. ’s investigative authority.

Therefore, the “I.R.S. [was] not required to establish [a] tax liability [by citing to a taxing statute] prior to issuance of [the] sum m ons[es].” U nited States v. McAnlis , 721 F.2d 334, 336 (11th Cir. 1983); see also First Nat’l Bank of Dallas , 635 F.2d at 395 (relying on the fact that a summons may issue in order to determine tax liability).

Regarding TrowbridgeÂ’s assertion that the district court failed to comply with F ED . R. C IV .

P. 52(a) because the court’s oral findings were no t sufficient to allow for adequate review of the judgment, we disagree. Pursuant to F E D . R. C IV . P. 52(a), a district court is required to “find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon” when an action before it is “tried upon the facts without a jury.” However, as we have previously noted, F E D . R. C IV . P. 52(a) “‘exacts neither punctilious detail nor slavish tracing of the clai ms issue by issue and witness by witness.’” Chandler , 958 F.2d at 89 (citations omitted). Rather, “[t]he touchstone of our Rule 52(a) analysis has remained the same over the years: Whether we, as an appellate court, can obtain a ‘full understanding of the issues on appeal.’” Chandler , 958 F.2d at 90 (citations omitted). In the district court’s oral findings, the court specifically stated that the government, through its proffer of an I.R.S. agent’s affidavit, as well as additional in formation, met the four factors annunciated in Powell for issuing a summons. Moreover, the court stated that the petitioner failed to provide evidence that disproved “any of the four Powell elements or any other appropriate grounds to challenge the summons . . . [for example an] abuse of the court process, [an] excessi ve burden placed on the taxpayer, [or] a substantial countervailing policy.” In addition, the trial court addressed Trowbridge’s Fifth Amendment claims, and Trowbridge’s standing as a non-lawyer to represent the trusts. Consequently, the trial court provided adequate findings of fact and conclusio ns o f law to allow for a review of its order.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4

1 In addition, Trowbridge has not argued on appeal that his request was made pursuant to F ED . R. C IV . P. 52(b). 2 See Colonial Penn Insur. v. Market Planners Insur. Agency Inc. , 157 F.3d 1032 (5th Cir. 1998) (examined the district courtÂ’s findings under Rule 52(a) to determine whether the findings were sufficient to allow for a review of the judgment); Chandler v. City of Dallas , 958 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1992) (district courtÂ’s oral findings of fact and conclusions of law did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 52(a))