PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

P ETER P AUL M ITRANO , Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 03-1414 C HRISTOPHER J. H AWES , d/b/a CJH

Color and Design Group, Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

James C. Cacheris, Senior District Judge. (CA-02-1841-A)

Argued: June 2, 2004

Decided: July 26, 2004 Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, LUTTIG, Circuit Judge,

and Louise W. FLANAGAN, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.

Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Chief Judge Wilkins

wrote the opinion, in which Judge Luttig and Judge Flanagan joined. COUNSEL ARGUED: Peter Paul Mitrano, Merrifield, Virginia, for Appellant.

John William Toothman, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

OPINION WILKINS, Chief Judge:

Peter Paul Mitrano, an attorney proceeding pro se, appeals a district

court order dismissing his breach of contract action based on

improper venue. 1 We vacate the judgment and remand for further pro-

ceedings. I. In August 2000, Mitrano entered into an oral agreement to provide

legal services to Christopher J. Hawes, doing business as CJH Color

and Design Group. A trademark infringement action by L'Oreal

Societe Anonyme was pending against Hawes in France because

Hawes had registered a website domain name, , with Network Solutions, Inc. Because of the lawsuit,

control of the domain name was deposited into the registry of the

French court.

At the time of the agreement, Mitrano resided in New Hampshire,

and Hawes resided in Massachusetts. Between December 2000 and

January 2001, however, Mitrano moved to Virginia while continuing

to provide legal services to Hawes. On April 12, 2001, Mitrano filed

a lawsuit on Hawes' behalf against Network Solutions and L'Oreal

Societe Anonyme in the Eastern District of Virginia ("Eastern Dis-

trict"), challenging the transfer of the domain name into the French

court registry ("the underlying suit"). The district court dismissed the

complaint, and on appeal, this court partially affirmed, partially

reversed, and remanded for further proceedings. See Hawes v. Net-

work Solutions, Inc. , 337 F.3d 377, 379 (4th Cir. 2003).

On December 19, 2002, Mitrano filed this action against Hawes in

the Eastern District, claiming that he provided approximately

$579,280 in legal services to Hawes and that Hawes had only paid

him $113,200. Hawes moved to dismiss, arguing that the district court

lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction and that venue was

Mitrano also appeals an order denying his motion to reconsider.

improper in the Eastern District. The district court concluded that it

had subject matter and personal jurisdiction. However, relying on our

decision in Broadcasting Co. of the Carolinas v. Flair Broadcasting

Corp. , 892 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1989), the district court reasoned that

Massachusetts, rather than Virginia, was the proper venue because:

  (1) the contract was formed in Massachusetts; (2) the negotiations

leading to the formation of the contract were held in Massachusetts;

  (3) the contract contemplated that services would be performed in

Massachusetts or France; (4) actual performance of the contract

occurred, in part, in Massachusetts; and (5) the alleged breach of the

contract (failure to make payments) took place in Massachusetts. The

district court therefore dismissed the action without conducting an

evidentiary hearing.

Mitrano moved for reconsideration, arguing that the 1990 amend-

ments to the federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391 (West 1993 &

Supp. 2004), rendered Broadcasting Co. obsolete. Mitrano argued

that, under the amended statute, venue was proper in the Eastern Dis-

trict because he "performed a substantial part of the legal services for

[Hawes] in [the Eastern District], namely research, drafting of plead-

ings, court appearances, court filings and review of the underlying lit-

igation that relates to this action." J.A. 31-32 (internal quotation

marks omitted). In addressing the motion, the district court recog-

nized that under the amended version of § 1391, venue for a given

suit could be appropriate in multiple districts. The district court never-

theless concluded that venue was not proper in the Eastern District

because Mitrano's performance of legal work was "tangential, not

substantial" to Mitrano's breach of contract claim. Id. at 36. The court

therefore denied the motion for reconsideration. II. Mitrano contends that the district court erred in ruling that venue

was improper in the Eastern District. We agree.

We review the district court venue ruling de novo. See United

States v. Newsom , 9 F.3d 337, 338 (4th Cir. 1993). To survive a

motion to dismiss for improper venue when no evidentiary hearing is held, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of venue.

See Delong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co. , 840 F.2d

, 845 (11th Cir. 1988).

Prior to 1990, § 1391 provided that an action based on diversity of

citizenshipÐas this one isÐcould be brought in the judicial district

"in which the claim arose." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1988). When it was

not clear that a claim arose in only one district, we applied a "weight

of the contacts" test for determining venue under § 1391(a). Broad-

casting Co. , 892 F.2d at 377 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under this test, venue was proper in the district having the most sig-

nificant connection with the claim. See id. at 376.

In 1990, § 1391 was amended to make venue proper in any "judi-

cial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giv-

ing rise to the claim occurred." 2 Judicial Improvements Act of 1990,

Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 311(1), 104 Stat. 5089, 5114. Congress

amended the statute because the prior language "led to wasteful litiga-

tion whenever several different forums were involved in the transac-

tions leading up to the dispute." Cottman Transmission Sys., Inc. v. Martino , 36 F.3d 291, 294 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Rep. of the Fed. Cts. Study Comm. 94 (Comm. Print 1990)). Under the amended statute,

it is possible for venue to be proper in more than one judicial district.

See Jenkins Brick Co. v. Bremer , 321 F.3d 1366, 1371 (11th Cir. 3). We therefore no longer apply the "weight of the contacts" test.

See Ciena Corp. v. Jarrard , 203 F.3d 312, 318 (4th Cir. 2000) (deter-

mining venue under amended statute without reference to "weight of

the contacts" test). Additionally, in determining whether events or

omissions are sufficiently substantial to support venue under the

amended statute, a court should not focus only on those matters that

are in dispute or that directly led to the filing of the action. See Uffner

v. La Reunion Francaise, S.A. , 244 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 2001).

Rather, it should review "the entire sequence of events underlying the

An action may also be brought in a judicial district where a defendant

resides, if all defendants reside in the same state, or where any defendant

is subject to personal jurisdiction, if there is no other district in which the

action may be brought. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(a). Because Hawes

resided in Massachusetts and venue would be proper in Massachusetts,

neither provision would provide a basis for venue in Virginia.

claim." Id. ; see First of Mich. Corp. v. Bramlet , 141 F.3d 260, 264

(6th Cir. 1998).

Applying these principles here, we conclude that Mitrano's work

under the contract constituted "a substantial part of the events [and]

omissions giving rise to [Mitrano's] claim" for breach of contract. 28

U.S.C.A. § 1391(a). Indeed, it was Mitrano's work that allegedly cre-

ated his entitlement to the payment he now seeks. For that reason,

depending on the amount of work that Mitrano completed in the East-

ern District, that work alone may be sufficient to justify venue there.

This conclusion is strongly supported by Uffner , which concerned a

bad faith claim-denial action against an insurer arising out of the sink-

ing of a yacht it insured. There, the First Circuit held that the sinking

of the yacht was a "substantial part of the events or omissions giving

rise to the claim" even though the claim did not concern how, when,

or why the accident occurred. See Uffner , 244 F.3d at 43. The court

reached that conclusion because the sinking of the vessel, like

Mitrano's performance of the legal services at issue here, was the

event that allegedly entitled the plaintiff to the payment sought under

the contract. See id. Because we reject the analysis of the district court, we vacate the

dismissal order and remand for reconsideration of the venue issue.

However, we note that a question apparently not previously addressed

by the parties or the district court is exactly what portion of Mitrano's

work was performed in the Eastern District. 3 We will not attempt to

delineate exactly how much work Mitrano would need to have com-

pleted in the Eastern District to support venue there, but rather, will

leave that legal question to the district court to answer in the first

instance on remand along with the factual question of how much

work Mitrano actually performed in the Eastern District. III. Hawes argues that even if venue is proper in the Eastern District,

Mitrano stated in his declaration that it was "a substantial part," J.A. (internal quotation marks omitted), and he maintained at oral argu-

ment that it was "more than half" of the work.

we should affirm the dismissal of Mitrano's suit on the basis that the

district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Hawes. We disagree.

When a district court rules on personal jurisdiction without holding

an evidentiary hearing, we view the facts in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff and determine de novo whether he has made a prima

facie showing of personal jurisdiction. See Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc. , 334 F.3d 390, 396 (4th Cir. 2003). To

establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant through

a state long arm statute, a court must first determine that jurisdiction

is authorized by state law. See Ellicott Mach. Corp. v. John Holland

Party Ltd. , 995 F.2d 474, 477 (4th Cir. 1993). If it is, the court must

next decide whether exercise of personal jurisdiction would be consis-

tent with due process. See English & Smith v. Metzger , 901 F.2d 36,

(4th Cir. 1990).

Virginia's long arm statute extends personal jurisdiction to the lim-

its allowed by due process. See id. ; Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-328.1 (Lex-

isNexis Supp. 2003). And, for a district court to exercise its

jurisdiction consistently with due process requirements, a defendant

before it must have "certain minimum contacts with [the forum state]

such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional

notions of fair play and substantial justice." Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash-

ington , 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The standard for determining whether a court may exercise personal

jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant depends on whether the

defendant's contacts with the forum state provide the basis for the

suit. See Carefirst of Md. , 334 F.3d at 397. If so, those contacts may

establish "specific jurisdiction." See id. ; Helicopteros Nacionales de

Colombia, S.A. v. Hall , 466 U.S. 408, 414 & n.8 (1984). To decide

whether specific jurisdiction exists, we examine "(1) the extent to

which the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of

conducting activities in the State; (2) whether the plaintiffs' claims

arise out of those activities directed at the State; and (3) whether the

exercise of personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally reason-

able." ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc. , 293 F.3d 707,

(4th Cir. 2002) (alteration & internal quotation marks omitted).

A defendant should be able to anticipate being sued in a court that can

exercise personal jurisdiction over him; thus, to justify such an exer-

cise of jurisdiction, a defendant's actions must have been "directed at

the forum state in more than a random, fortuitous, or attenuated way."

ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc. , 126 F.3d 617, 625 (4th Cir. 7).

Here, Mitrano contends that Hawes purposefully directed his activ-

ities into Virginia by prosecuting the underlying suit there. Although

it is undisputed that Mitrano's breach of contract case arises out of the

action that Mitrano and Hawes prosecuted in Virginia, Hawes argues

that he did not purposefully direct his activities toward Virginia and

that it would be unfair for him to defend Mitrano's suit there because

it was Mitrano, not Hawes, who selected the forum for the underlying

suit. See Hanson v. Denckla , 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) ("The unilat-

eral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident

defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum

State."). However, even assuming Hawes was not involved in the ini-

tial selection of the forum, viewing the record in the light most favor-

able to Mitrano, Hawes knew that the suit had been filed there.

Indeed, Hawes admits in his declaration that Mitrano provided him

with "copies of papers that he had filed . . . in the U.S. District Court

in Alexandria, Virginia . . . ." J.A. 65. Thus, Hawes' knowing contin-

uation of the suit in Virginia demonstrates that his availment of Vir-

ginia's legal protections was purposeful. See Daynard v. Ness,

Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A. , 290 F.3d 42, 55 (1st Cir. 2) ("Whether or not an agent is initially authorized to act on

behalf of a principal, the agent's actions may be attributed to the prin-

cipal, for purposes of personal jurisdiction, if the principal later rati-

fies the agent's conduct."); Int'l. Med. Group v. Am. Arbitration

Ass'n , 312 F.3d 833, 845 (7th Cir. 2002) (attributing the actions of the

defendant's attorneys to the defendant for purposes of determining the

existence of personal jurisdiction); cf. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 471 U.S. 462, 479 n.22 (1985) (stating that commercial

activities performed on a party's behalf "may sometimes be ascribed

to the party" but not "resolv[ing] the permissible bounds of such attri-

bution"). And, considering that Hawes allowed Mitrano to continue

to litigate on his behalf in Virginia, there is nothing unfair about

requiring him to defend the resulting fee suit in the same forum. 4

Hawes maintains that if we determine that the district court possessed

personal jurisdiction over him and that venue was appropriate in Vir- IV. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court correctly

concluded that Mitrano made out a prima facie case of personal juris-

diction over Hawes, but we reject the basis provided by the district

court for dismissing Mitrano's suit for lack of venue. We therefore

vacate the dismissal order and remand for reconsideration of the

venue issue. VACATED AND REMANDED ginia, this action should be transferred to Massachusetts pursuant to 28

U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) (West 1993) ("For the convenience of parties and

witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil

action to any other district or division where it might have been

brought."). Mitrano also argues that he is entitled to summary judgment

on the merits of his claim. Because the district court has never ruled on

these issues, we will allow that court to address them in the first instance

should the court conclude on remand that venue is proper.