Federal Circuits, 7th Cir. (February 26, 1985)
Docket number: 82-1944,82-2000
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Cir. - Leydel Willis, Appellant, v. Watson Chapel School District, Appellee, Darryl Messer, President, Dr. Timothy Carter, Jim Johnson, George N. Mays, Levert Blunt, Jr., Individually and as Members of the Watson Chapel School District Board of Directors. Leydel Willis, Appellee, v. Watson Chapel School District, Appellant, Darryl Messer, President, Dr. Timothy Carter, Jim Johnson, George N. Mays, Levert Blunt, Jr., Individually and as Members of the Watson Chapel School District Board of Directors., 899 F.2d 745 (8th Cir. 1990) Appellant, v. Watson Chapel School District, Appellee, Darryl Messer, President, Dr. Timothy Carter, Jim Johnson, George N. Mays, Levert Blunt, Jr., Individually and as Members of the Watson Chapel School District Board of Directors. Leydel Willis, Appellee, v. Watson Chapel School District, Appellant, Darryl Messer, President, Dr. Timothy Carter, Jim Johnson, George N. Mays, Levert Blunt, Jr., Individually and as Members of the Watson Chapel School District Board of Directors.
James D. Stevens, Elkhart, Ind., for plaintiff-appellant.
William J. Cohen, Elkhart, Ind., for defendant-appellee.Before ESCHBACH and COFFEY, Circuit Judges, and SWYGERT, Senior Circuit Judge.SWYGERT, Senior Circuit Judge.Vera Horn, the prevailing plaintiff in the Title VII action below, appeals from the district court's refusal to award her back pay. The defendant, Duke Homes, Inc. ("Duke"), a division of the Indiana corporation Windsor Mobile Homes, Inc., cross-appeals from the district court's finding that it was liable for sex-based discrimination against Horn. We affirm the district court's finding of liability and reverse its denial of back pay.* On May 5, 1980 Horn was discharged from her employ as a factory worker for Duke, a manufacturer of mobile homes. After receiving notice of right to sue from the EEOC, Horn filed suit alleging that she was terminated because of her refusal to respond to the sexual advances of Duke's plant superintendent, Frank Haas, and that her right to refuse such advances was protected by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. Secs . 2000e-2000e-17 (1982). After a bench trial, the district judge entered judgment for Horn.At trial Horn testified that she was forty-seven years old and began her employ with Duke in August 1979. Transcript of Proceedings at 18 (hereinafter cited as "T."). She was hired by Frank Haas, T. 21, who after a few months began to make sexual advances, T. 21-22. The advances took the form of leers, T. 22, 34, obscene gestures, T. 34, 37, lewd comments, T. 31, 32, 35, remarks about her sexual needs now that her husband had left her, T. 31, 36, and promises that he would make it "easy" for her at Duke if she would "go out" with him, T. 25, 30, 36. Horn rejected these advances, T. 31, 36, the last of which occurred two weeks before her discharge, T. 35-36. Shortly after the last rejection, Haas orally reprimanded her for substandard work, T. 49-50. Following the reprimand, the first she had ever received during her tenure at Duke, Horn was transferred to another section of the production line for approximately one week, T. 21-35, 49-54. Then, she was abruptly called into Haas' office and terminated, T. 54.Horn attempted to corroborate her testimony in two respects. First, Hans Nast, a former employee of Duke, testified that he overheard Haas tell Horn "to the effect that if she would get together with him she wouldn't have to work so hard." T. 89. Second, Horn introduced the testimony of three former female employees of Duke to establish Haas' propensity to use his power at Duke to sexually exploit women who were vulnerable because of marital problems and financial dependency on their jobs.Leanna Miller testified that Haas physically compelled her to have oral sex with him, T. 108. She was divorced at the time, T. 109, and subsequently began an affair with Haas' brother in part because she believed it would make it "easier" for her at Duke, T. 111-12, a motive that also eventually caused her again to have sexual relations with Haas at the factory, T. 114-15.Pattie King testified that shortly after she separated from her husband, she took a job with Duke, T. 118-19. After a few months, Haas commented about her single status and made sexual advances, which King refused, T. 120-22. Following this incident, Haas consistently began to walk into King in order to brush up against her breasts, T. 122-23. When she asked for a raise in order to support her children and furnish her home, Haas stated that all she had to do was to "cooperate" with him, T. 124-25. King threatened to "put him in his place with a weapon," T. 126, but eventually decided, instead, to leave her job, T. 127.Anita Loomis testified that while an employee at Duke, she had an affair with Haas, T. 137. The affair was voluntary and lasted approximately two years, T. 137-39.Duke introduced several witnesses who testified that Horn was unable to perform her job satisfactorily, T. 164-65, 173, 197-98, 204, 210. Haas testified that he discharged Horn because of complaints about her work. T. 223-25. Although he had given her two merit raises to reward her for good work, T. 247-49, Haas believed that Horn's marital problems caused an abrupt decline in her job performance, which led to her termination, T. 222-24. Haas denied making sexual advances to Horn and King, T. 227, 257, but he admitted that he asked Horn to have a drink with him and other Duke employees, T. 237. Haas also admitted having sexual relations with Miller and Loomis, although he asserted that both relationships were uncoerced, T. 229-30.Howard Lesher, Haas' supervisor, testified that, immediately after her termination, Horn complained to him about Haas' behavior, T. 269-70. After investigating the charges, he concluded that Horn was terminated because her personal problems prevented her from performing her job satisfactorily, T. 270-72. Lesher asserted that Haas normally had absolute authority to hire and fire the employees Haas supervised without consulting him, T. 280. Although it was the company's policy to terminate only for good cause, Lesher conceded that it was Haas who had the authority to determine whether that standard had been met, T. 280-81. Lesher asserted, however, that neither he nor the company condoned sexual harassment of its employees, T. 273.The district judge reasoned that the case hinged on a simple credibility determination and concluded that Haas' testimony was not credible. T. 314-15; see also Finding of Fact No. 5. Not only did Haas make sexual advances toward Horn, but sexual harassment characterized "the totality of his relationship with women in the plant." T. 316; see also Finding of Fact No. 5 (Horn's testimony was credible and corroborated by testimony of Nast, Miller, and King). The complaints about Horn's performance were "thin" and "belated" and, consequently, the employer failed to show any legitimate cause for Horn's termination. T. 316, 319. Accordingly, the district judge concluded that Horn had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that consent to Haas' sexual advances was a condition of employment and that such a condition violated Horn's Title VII rights. Conclusion of Law No. 3.The remedy ordered by the district judge was to assess "front pay" at $48.00 per day from the date of judgment until the date of Horn's eventual reinstatement and $3,000 in attorney's fees. The district judge expressly refused to award back pay. T. 320-21. He reasoned that he enjoyed "discretion" with respect to this issue, T. 320-21, and that the record was "just not adequate" for the award to be made, T. 320.IIWe turn first to the district court's finding of liability. Duke challenges no finding of fact.1 Rather, it argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the district judge found that the supervisory hierarchy above Haas neither knew nor approved of Haas' sexual misconduct. Appellee's Brief at 16. In addition, Duke somewhat cryptically challenges Horn's premise that Title VII protects an employee's right to refuse to submit to sexual relations as a condition of employment. See id. at 14 (alluding to cases where sexual harassment was successfully challenged as not stating a cause of action).We hold that Title VII prohibits an employer, acting through one of its supervisory employees, from imposing sexual consideration as a condition of employment.2 Although it is true that other doctrinal vehicles can be used to remedy the type of wrong committed by Haas,3 sexual consideration constitutes precisely the kind of "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barrier[ ] to employment," that Title VII was intended to prevent. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 853, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). But for Horn's womanhood, Haas would not have demanded sex as a condition of employment. Accord Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C.Cir.1977). Because of her sex, therefore, Horn was disadvantaged by pressure to submit to an additional, humiliating condition of employment that served no legitimate purpose of the employer. Her right to refuse this condition was protected by Title VII. The cases holding to the contrary have been repudiated,4 and our holding is in accord with that of every circuit that has reached the issue.5We also decline Duke's invitation to require "actual or constructive knowledge of a supervisor's conduct and failure to take remedial action before holding an employer liable for sexual harassment involving tangible job detriment." Appellee's Brief at 16. Such a requirement may be necessary in those cases where the plaintiff is sexually harassed by his or her co-employees, see, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C.Cir.1981), though we need not decide that issue in this case, see supra note 2. But with respect to the discriminatory acts of supervisory employees, Duke's position finds no support in either precedent or policy.Every circuit that has reached the issue has adopted the EEOC's rule imposing strict liability on employers for the acts of sexual harassment committed by their supervisory employees:Applying general Title VII principles, an employer, ... is responsible for its acts and those of its agents and supervisory employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the specific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known of their occurrence....29 C.F.R. Sec. 1604.11(c);6 accord Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir.1982); Bundy, 641 F.2d at 947; Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir.1979). Although the Third Circuit originally suggested that actual or constructive knowledge of the employer might be appropriate, see Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (3d Cir.1977), that circuit has recently repudiated such a requirement, see Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, 721 F.2d 77, 80 (3d Cir.1983).7The policy justification Duke advances is that "sexual harassment is an intentional act done for private gratification.... How can a company be held responsible for such actions unless it is notified of them?" Appellee's Brief at 16. We disagree. First, Duke's reification of the "company" invites an ill-advised descent into the world of legal fiction. The "company" is a legal form; it can "act" only through its duly-appointed agents. Where, as here, the supervisory employee is given "absolute" authority to hire and fire, see supra at 3-4, and uses this authority to extort sexual favors from employees, the supervisor is, for all intents and purposes, the company.Second, courts have long used the doctrine of respondeat superior to impose liability on principals for the intentional torts of their agents. See generally W. Prosser, The Law of Torts Secs. 69-70 (1971). The reasoning behind this rule is rarely articulated, though the more modern cases tend to rely on a risk allocation theory: the employer, not the innocent plaintiff, should bear the cost of the torts of its employees as a required cost of doing business, insofar as such torts are reasonably foreseeable and the employer is a more efficient cost avoider than the injured plaintiff. E.g., Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir.1968) (Friendly, J.); see generally W. Prosser, supra, at Sec. 69 p. 459; Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499, 543-45 (1961). Thus, the answer to Duke's question, "How can a company be held responsible for such [discriminatory] actions unless it is notified of them?" is that sex discrimination can best be eradicated by enforcing a strict liability rule that ensures compensation for victims and creates an incentive for the employer to take the strongest possible affirmative measures to prevent the hiring and retention of sexist supervisors. Cf. Calabresi, supra, 70 Yale L.J. at 500-07, 514-17 (goods produced by entrepreneurs who do not assume the costs of remedying a tort (in this case sexism) are artificially cheap; forcing them to internalize the costs of the tort regardless of fault eliminates incentives to be sexist and ensures proper allocation of societal resources).Duke attempts to invoke the limiting principle that respondeat superior does not apply where the agent acts outside the scope of his employment. Appellee's Brief at 16. An agent acts outside the scope of employment where his conduct is either not "of a kind he is authorized to perform" or not "actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the principal." Restatement (Second) of Agency Secs. 228(1)(a), (c) (1958). It could be argued that because Haas was not authorized to discriminate on the basis of sex and because his sexual proclivities were wholly unconnected to the well-being of the employer, he was acting outside the scope of his employment. On the other hand, by delegating power to Haas the "employer" and Haas essentially merged; as long as the tort complained of was caused by the exercise of this supervisory power, Haas should be deemed as acting within the scope of his employment, and the employer should be held liable for the tort. See supra at 8. Furthermore, the same risk allocation policies that have been used by modern courts to justify broad respondeat superior liability also justify limiting the scope-of-employment exception. See, e.g., Bushey, 398 F.2d at 170-72.Third, whatever the result under the common law of agency, Title VII demands that employers be held strictly liable for the discriminatory employment decisions of their supervisory personnel who are delegated the power to make such employment decisions. See, e.g., Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1282 (7th Cir.1977); see generally Development, New EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 61 B.U.L.Rev. 535, 538-45 (1981); Note, Sexual Harassment and Title VII: The Foundation for the Elimination of Sexual Cooperation as an Employment Condition, 76 Mich.L.Rev. 1007, 1025-30 (1978). It was Congress' judgment that employers, not the victims of discrimination, should bear the cost of remedying and eradicating employment discrimination. The strict liability rule is admirably suited for this purpose. Indeed, courts have applied the rule without hesitation in every Title VII context except sexual harassment. See generally Development, supra, 61 B.U.L.Rev. at 540; Note, supra, 76 Mich.L.Rev. at 1025. A different rule for sex discrimination would be contrary to Congress' finding that "discrimination against women is no less serious than other prohibited forms of discrimination,"8 and, now that earlier sexual harassment cases have been repudicated, contrary to all viable precedent.We therefore adopt the EEOC's strict liability rule codified at 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1604.11(c). Applying that rule to this case, we note that Duke does not question either Haas' supervisory power or the exercise of that power to sexually harass Horn.9 Accordingly, we affirm the district court's finding of liability.IIIThe second issue presented is Horn's appeal from the district judge's denial of back pay. With regard to the district judge's assertion that he had "discretion" on this issue, T. 320, we note that "Congress' purpose in vesting a variety of 'discretionary' powers in the courts [in ordering Title VII damages] was not to limit appellate review of trial courts, or to invite inconsistency and caprice, but rather to make possible the 'fashion[ing] [of] the most complete relief possible.' " Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2373, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975). Because a denial of back pay undercuts Congress' directive to afford the plaintiff "complete relief," back pay must be awarded unless "special factors" are shown; such special factors "usually include only circumstances where state legislation is in conflict with Title VII." Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445, 451 (7th Cir.1976), cert. denied,Try vLex for FREE for 3 days
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