July 23, 1996

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 96-1199

JOHN T. ZERVAS,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge, Boudin and Lynch, Circuit Judges.

John T. Zervas on brief pro se.

Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, and Sara Miron Bloom, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellees.

Per Curiam. The district court dismissed the complaint in this case, apparently both for lack of merit and for want of jurisdiction.

If Zervas' complaint is construed as a claim to have suffered age discrimination, the complaint was time barred since it was filed more than 180 days after the alleged discriminatory act. See Castro v. United States, 775 F.2d 399, 403 (1st Cir. 1985) ("[I]n lieu of pursuing administrative relief, [a federal employee claiming age discrimination] may proceed directly to federal district court . . . no later than 180 days from the alleged discriminatory act."); 29 U.S.C. 633a(d). If the complaint is construed as an appeal of the decision by the Merit Systems Protection Board denying Zervas' claim to have his sick leave reinstated, the complaint was not only untimely but also filed in the wrong court. 5 U.S.C. 7703(b)(1) (appeal of final order of Board "shall be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit . . . within 30 days after the petitioner received notice of the final order of decision of the Board").

Since abiding by a limitation period is a jurisdictional prerequisite to actions against the federal government, Lavery v. Marsh, 918 F.2d 1022, 1027 n.7 (1st Cir. 1990), the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the complaint, however construed.

Affirmed.