The Designer's Duty - Time For Review
Introduction
To understand their risk exposure fully, architects, engineers
and other construction professionals engaged in design work need to
know the extent of their design liability. 'Extent' for
these purposes means two things: what they are obliged to do, and
for how long that obligation continues.
By its very nature, design is not a static concept. The notion
of design development is well-understood. Sometimes, the need to
alter the design exceeds mere development and involves a
reappraisal of aspects of the original design concept. On an
ongoing project, a variety of matters can occur which require
reconsideration of the original design. Sometimes these events can
occur after completion.
This paper is concerned with the extent of the duty to revisit
or review the original design and seeks to examine the following
questions in the light of recent developments in case law:
What does the duty to review a design comprise?
How long does the duty to review a design last?
What are the legal consequences of breach of the duty to review
a design in the sense of damages claimable?
For simplicity, the notional designer selected in this paper is
the architect, though the same considerations apply equally to
engineers and other construction professionals undertaking
design.
1. What Does The Duty To Review A Design Comprise?
It has long been established that an architect has a duty to
review his design. The writer has previously analysed the cases
which established this principle.1 The Court of Appeal
in Brickfield Properties v Newton held that, 'The
architect is under a continuing duty to check that his design will
work in practice and to correct any errors which may
emerge.'2
This principle has been applied in a number of well known
construction cases since. HHJ Stabb QC in London Borough of
Merton v Lowe declared himself '... now satisfied that the
architect's duty of design is a continuing
one',3 while HHJ Newey QC in Equitable Debenture
Assets Corporation v William Moss Group stated that,
'Morgan's obligation to design International House was
not, I think, a once and for all obligation, performed when a
complete set of working drawings, which included Alpine's, was
sent to Moss [the main contractor]. Morgan had both the
right and the duty to check their initial design as work proceeded
and to correct it if necessary.'4
In University of Glasgow v William Whitfield,
HHJ Bowsher QC also spoke of the duty to design as 'a
continuing duty.'5
What obligations are comprehended in the duty to review must, in
part, depend on what the architect has agreed to do within the
envelope of his professional duty. What he has been originally
engaged to do must be expected to have an effect on the nature of
the continuing duty, if only because the opportunities for review
will be so different.
In the early cases, the judges still spoke routinely of
'supervision' of the project. Thus in Victoria
University of Manchester v Hugh Wilson HHJ Newey QC explained
the architect's contractual and tortious duties as:
'... to exercise the skill and care to be expected of a
competent architect in designing the Centre, in supervising its
construction and, when and if necessary, reviewing and
amending the design.'6 [emphasis added]
More recently, it could not be taken for granted that the
architect would have undertaken a duty of supervision. In the RIBA
standard form conditions of engagement, the word
'supervision' has been conspicuously absent for some 25
years. It is true that in some more modern cases like Alexander
Corfield v David Grant, HHJ Bowsher QC could still be found
referring to 'supervision'.7 However, that
appears to have been based on implied terms of engagement. More
typical today would be Consarc Design v Hutch Investments,
where the same judge observed that while
'The older forms of contract required the architect to
"supervise". The more recent contracts including the
contract in this case, require the architect to "visit the
Works to inspect the progress and quality of the
Works".'8
His conclusion was that, 'It seems to me that inspection is
a lesser responsibility than supervision.'9
It may be readily conceded that engineers do still undertake
supervision,10 that architects in many jurisdictions
have statutory obligations of supervision11 and that UK
architects could still undertake supervision expressly or by
implication.12 But it seems logical that the 'lesser
responsibility' of inspection would afford fewer opportunities
for a review of the design than a full supervision obligation. It
is surely beyond question that an architect who undertook design
services only and had no part in the construction phase must be
regarded differently in terms of ongoing responsibility. If that is
right, it would follow that different levels – and
different durations – of a duty to review would attach to
different packages of professional services to be supplied.
In Tesco Stores v The Norman Hitchcox
Partnership,13 the architect had been engaged to
design shell works but was not involved in the site-based phase of
the works whilst the building contract was in progress. Later he
was engaged by Tesco in respect of the fitting out works of the
completed development. HHJ Esyr Lewis QC said that such latter
engagement could not enlarge the contractual duties under the
original retainer to design the shell works. As to the latter, he
had a continuing contractual obligation to answer reasonable
queries about his drawings which might have arisen during the
construction period and to draw attention to and, if necessary,
correct any deficiency of which he became aware during that
period.
Precisely what it is that the architect must do as part of his
obligation to review was addressed in the Technology and
Construction Court in New Islington and Hackney Housing
Association v Pollard Thomas and Edwards.14 In that
case, Dyson J (as he then was) found that the extent of the duty
would indeed depend upon what the designer had originally
undertaken. The case concerned serious noise disturbance
experienced by tenants in a housing association development as a
result of inadequate sound insulation between flats. Since it was
in dispute whether the claim against the architects was out of
time, it became crucial to establish when the cause of action
accrued.
Dyson J began his consideration, the most detailed undertaken of
the issue, by accepting the proposition that 'a designer who
also supervises or inspects work will generally be obliged to
review that design up until that design has been included in the
work', and noting that, 'In a number of cases, it has been
held that this duty continues until practical
completion.'15
Even at this stage Dyson J added the caveat that, '... it is
necessary to look at the circumstances of each engagement
...'16
His view of the Sachs LJ dictum in Brickfield
Properties17 is enlightening:
'But Sachs LJ was not concerned to explore the
scope of an architect's continuing duty to review his
design. In my judgment, the duty does not require the architect to
review any particular aspect of the design that he has already
completed unless he has good reasons for so
doing.'18 [emphasis added]
Dyson J also took a restrictive view of Judge Bowsher's
comments in the University of Glasgow case19
stating:
'I do not believe that Judge Bowsher was stating a general
principle that an architect is usually under a duty to review his
design even after practical completion. I think that his decision
was heavily coloured by the special facts of the case. In my view,
that case should be regarded as an example of an architect agreeing
to investigate the cause of defects in a building outside the terms
of his original retainer, and not as an example of the
performance of a continuing duty to review his design under the
original contract of engagement.'20
[emphasis added]
So what are the circumstances in which the architect must review
his design? The earlier cases had led the writer to conclude that
some form of trigger event was necessary and it was not sufficient
merely to point to the fact of the architect's continuing
involvement in the project.
Thus HHJ Stabb QC in Merton v Lowe, while describing
the duty of design as 'a continuing one', qualified this by
reference to '... the subsequent discovery of a defect in the
design, initially and justifiably thought to have been
suitable' the effect of which was that it 'reactivated
or revived the architect's duty in relation to design and
imposed upon them the duty to take such steps as where necessary to
correct the results of that initially defective
design.'21 [emphasis added]
It is true that HHJ Newey QC in Equitable Debenture Assets
Corporation had referred to an obligation to design by the
architects which included 'the duty to check their initial
design as work proceeded and to correct it if
necessary'22 [emphasis added]. However it
should be recalled that on the facts, the sealant of the curtain
walling (whose erroneous specification lay at the heart of the
problem) had failed from the start, so that the
'buildability' difficulties experienced by the contractors
had been known to the architect for many months. In other words, it
should not be assumed that HHJ Newey QC was suggesting the duty to
review the design arose automatically in the absence of a trigger
event.
More obviously consistent with Merton v
Lowe23 was the qualification of HHJ Newey QC in the
Victoria University of Manchester case to the effect that
the architect's duties included 'when and if necessary,
reviewing and amending the design.'24
Similarly, HH Judge Bowsher QC in the University of
Glasgow case was concerned with the situation '... where,
as here, an architect has had drawn to his attention that damage
has resulted from a design which he knew or ought to have known was
bad from the start ...'25 In such circumstances, the
designer would have 'a particular duty to his client to
disclose what he had been...
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