The Letter Of The Law

Even black-letter law is not limited to words on a printed page: beneath and behind statutory language, values and principles which are often nowhere to be seen in the statute's text lie at the heart of the enacted law. A statute's silence, in this sense, does not stop it from speaking.

Elmer's inheritance: Riggs v Palmer

In 1882, Francis Palmer was poisoned. His killer: Elmer, his sixteen-year-old grandson, to whom he had left almost all of his New York estate. Elmer knew of the contents of his grandfather's will; he had been afraid that Palmer would change it, and wanted to find a way to enjoy, without any further delay, the property which in his view was rightfully his. Elmer was prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned for his grandfather's murder: eventually, it fell to the Court of Appeals of New York in Riggs v Palmer 115 NY 506 (1889) to decide whether he should inherit the fortune.

The New York statute of wills said nothing explicit about whether a person named in a will could benefit from its provisions if he happened to have murdered the testator. Nevertheless, Earl J, giving the majority opinion in Palmer, distinguished 'the letter of the statute' (its words) from 'the statute' itself (the law it created). He concluded that it could not have been the legislator's intention for a will to operate in favour of someone who had killed in order to secure his ancestor's property: Elmer could not, therefore, inherit under its provisions. Earl J endorsed Matthew Bacon's 'equitable' approach to construction (Abridgment, VI.385):

'In order to form a right judgment whether a case be within the equity of a statute, it is a good way to suppose the law-maker present, and that you have asked him this question, did you intend to comprehend this case? Then you must give yourself such answer as you imagine he, being an upright and reasonable man, would have given.'

Earl J warned that qui haeret in litera, haeret in cortice: clinging to the letter means clinging to the bark (going only skin-deep, never getting to the heart of the matter); he also argued that fundamental common law principles fell to be considered, since, as a matter of public policy, it would be an affront to justice to allow Elmer to profit from his own wrong (as volenti non fit injuria).

Gray J dissented: in his judgment, the statutory requirements for the execution, alteration and revocation of wills were 'strict and systematic' and simply did not allow for 'considerations of an...