Supreme Court Upholds 'Neutral' Ethics And Religious Culture Course In Quebec

S.L. v. Commission scolaire des Chênes, 2012 SCC 7

This morning, the Supreme Court of Canada released an important decision on freedom of conscience and religion as protected by s. 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The case related to an "Ethics and Religious Culture" or "ERC" course implemented by a Quebec school board, the Commission scolaire des Chênes.

The implementation of the ERC course was challenged by the parents of two school aged children who established a sincere belief as to their obligation to pass on the precepts of the Catholic religion to their children. The parents had applied to have their children exempted from attending the ERC course, but their applications were refused by the board.

The trial judge found that the ERC course consisted of an objective presentation of various religions, and did not place children "in an obligatory and coercive situation". In other words, it was found that this course did not serve to indoctrinate children towards any particular religious viewpoints, but rather taught them about some of the religious belief systems around them. Consequently, the trial judge dismissed the parents' application for a declaration that the implementation of the course constituted a violation of s. 2(a), and the Court of Appeal affirmed this decision.

In dismissing the challenge, Deschamps J. affirmed the point established in such cases as Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 2004 SCC 47, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 that a person invoking rights under s. 2(a) does not have to show that the practice the person sincerely believes he or she must observe or the belief the person endorses corresponds to a religious precept recognized by other followers. If the person believes that he or she has an obligation to act in accordance with a practice or endorses a belief "having a nexus with religion", the court is limited to assessing the sincerity of the person's belief. As Lebel J. stated in his concurring reasons, "the courts do not search an applicant's soul or conscience and do not seek to become theologians."

However, Deschamps J. also explained that although the above approach continues to apply to proving the existence of a religious belief or practice, a violation of such a belief cannot simply be based upon a sincere belief on the part of the person that their freedom of religion has been infringed. Rather, at this infringement stage, the person must still establish the violation on a balance of...