Where Do You Sit If There Is No Seat? The Relevance Of The 'Procedural Law' In International Arbitration
Well-drafted arbitration clauses in international contracts
state that any arbitration is to have its seat in a particular
location — for example, to name some of the recognised
international arbitration centres, London, Paris or
Singapore.
This does not just mean that the arbitral tribunal will be
"sitting" in that particular place, and that hearings
will be conducted there. The choice of a seat brings with it
the adoption of the laws relating to arbitration of that
particular place. What happens if the arbitration clause does
not specify the seat? What issues may be affected by the law of
the seat — is it just procedural matters or can the law
of the seat have a more substantial impact? This article
reviews these questions.
The seat of the arbitration
Arbitration as a process is based on party autonomy, and the
ability of the parties to choose their own desired procedure:
procedural flexibility is often perceived as one of the
advantages of arbitration. But the law of the seat can impose
limits on that procedural freedom. The effect of the law of the
seat on an arbitration was recognised as long ago as the Geneva
Protocol on Arbitration Clauses 1923 (signed under the auspices
of the League of Nations):
" 2. The arbitral procedure, including the
constitution of the arbitral tribunal, shall be governed by the
will of the parties and by the law of the country in whose
territory the arbitration takes place..."
The UNCITRAL Model Law1, which has become the
basis for the arbitrations laws of many jurisdictions, provides
a legal framework that is supportive of arbitration, without
undue interference by national Courts in the parties'
private dispute resolution method. Adopting a country with
arbitration laws based on the Model Law as the seat may be a
relatively safe bet. But what if the commercial background is
such that the parties want another system of law (not that of
the seat) to be the governing law of the contract?
As we will see, it is quite possible to choose, for example,
Switzerland as the seat (thereby submitting to the provisions
of Swiss arbitration law) while specifying that the tribunal is
to apply English law when resolving the actual dispute.
International arbitrations frequently involve more than just
one system of law2.
Procedural and substantive laws may
differ
The concept of a separate system of law governing the
procedure of the arbitration (usually being the law of the
seat) has its origins in civil law. It has also been accepted
in common law jurisdictions: in a well-known decision, the
House of Lords described the reasons why parties might adopt a
dichotomy between the governing law and the law of the
seat3. In Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation SA
v Cie d'Armement Maritime SA [1971] AC 572, their
Lordships said:
" My Lords, it is possible for parties to a contract
to choose one system of law as the proper law of their
contract and a different system of law as the curial law.
Although they may want their mutual rights and obligations
under the contract to be ascertained by reference to the
system of law of a country with which the transaction has
some close and real connection, they may nonetheless consider
that the arbitral procedure adopted in some other country, or
the high reputation and commercial expertise of arbitrators
available there, make the curial law of that country
preferable to the curial law of the country whose system of
law they have chosen as the proper law."
It may also be that the parties and arbitrators wish to hold
hearings in a place that is particularly convenient for them,
but which is not in the country that is the seat. This is
possible: the juridical seat of the arbitration and the place
where hearings are held may be distinct4. However,
the introduction of such a distinction means there is more
scope for confusion and getting the drafting wrong.
The importance of a clearly drafted arbitration
agreement
With several geographical locations and potentially relevant
systems of law comes a need for precise drafting. The English
Courts recently considered an arbitration clause that was
defective on its face, suffering from "seat
confusion". In Braes of Doune Wind Farm (Scotland) Ltd
v Alfred McAlpine Business Services Ltd [2008] EWHC 426
(TCC), Akenhead J was presented with an arbitration clause that
stated:
" (c) This arbitration agreement is subject to
English Law and the seat of the arbitration shall be Glasgow,
Scotland. Any such reference to arbitration shall be deemed
to be a reference to arbitration within the meaning of the
Arbitration Act 1996 or any statutory
re-enactment."
However, the Arbitration Act 1996 does not apply to
Scotland5. Was the express reference to Glasgow,
Scotland being the "seat" sufficient to override the
(equally express) references to English law found in the 1996
Act? Akenhead J found that on its true construction, Glasgow
was only intended to be the place where the arbitration
hearings would be held, but England was the true juridical seat
of the arbitration. The consequence of that finding was that
the English Courts had jurisdiction to hear any application to
appeal the award — an issue to which we will
return6.
In coming to his conclusion, Akenhead J explained the
concept of the "juridical seat":
" The word "juridical" is not an
irrelevant word or a word to be ignored in ascertaining what
the "seat" is. It means and connotes the
administration of justice so far as the arbitration is
concerned. It implies that there must be a country whose job
it is to administer, control or decide what control there is
to be over an arbitration."
Such statements are unsurprising coming from an English
Judge. In 1981, the Court of Appeal made it plain that English
law did not recognise "arbitral procedures in the
transnational firmament unconnected with any municipal system
of law"7 and, despite commentators
imagining what such a truly international and self-policing
arbitration might be like, the attitude of the English Courts
has not changed in the last 27 years.
In the Peruvian Insurance case, the Court of Appeal
explained that8:
" There is equally no reason in theory which
precludes parties to agree that an arbitration shall be held
at a place or in country X but subject to the procedural laws
of Y. The limits and implications of any such agreement have
been much discussed in the literature, but apart from the
decision in the instant case there appears to be no reported
case where this has happened. This is not surprising when one
considers the complexities and inconveniences which such an
agreement would involve. Thus, at any rate under the
principles of English law, which rest upon the territorially
limited jurisdiction of our Courts, an agreement to arbitrate
in X subject to English procedural law would not empower our
Courts to exercise jurisdiction over the arbitration in
X."
The adoption of the procedural or arbitration laws of a
place gives a strong indication that the parties wanted that
place to be the seat of their arbitration9 (and in
Braes, Akenhead J effectively concluded that despite
the parties referring to another place as their
"seat", that other place was not in fact the intended
seat). In practical terms, it would simply be too cumbersome to
embark on an arbitration held in France, with the French Courts
supervising the proceedings but applying foreign, English
arbitration law.
Finding a seat: interpreting badly drafted
arbitration clauses
So where does that leave arbitration clauses drafted in a
less than ideal manner? "Finding a seat" may be seen
as two-step process. First, attempting to construe the
arbitration clause to see if it might nevertheless be possible
to work out an answer as specifically agreed by the parties.
Second, if the contract fails to assist, or if there is a
dispute between the parties, the matter will have to be
referred to the arbitrator, the supervisory body of any
arbitral institution or (as a last resort) a national
Court.
It should be recalled that the concept of the
"juridical seat" is generally understood as a
particular state or territory associated with a distinct and
recognisable system of law. With that in mind, we suggest the
following guidelines when interpreting an arbitration
clause:
Where the parties have stated that their arbitration is
to be held in a particular place (even if the word
"seat" is not used), that place should be the seat
unless the clause makes it clear that this is only meant to
be the place for hearings.
Where the parties have referred to a particular
procedural law as applying to any arbitration (or
"lex arbitri", "curial law",
"law of the arbitration" or "law of the
arbitration agreement"), but have not referred to a
place where the arbitration is to be held or mentioned its
seat, then the seat should be the state or territory
corresponding to the system of law.
Where the parties have referred both to a place and a
system of law, but these do not correspond, the seat is
likely to be the state or territory corresponding to the
system of law — because the Courts of that country will
then have the power to apply that system of law in
supervising the arbitration.
It may however be necessary to seek the assistance of the
arbitrator or the arbitral institution to determine the seat.
Many of the major rules confer jurisdiction to determine the
seat to the tribunal, and by adopting these rules, the parties
agree that someone else can fix the seat if they fail to do so
in the contract.
The LCIA Rules, perhaps unsurprisingly, favour London as the
seat. Article 16.1 confirms this as the
"default" position whilst giving the LCIA Court (the
institutional supervisory body, not the arbitrator(s)) a power
to designate a different seat if deemed appropriate. The ICC
Rules (Article 14) also confirm that the ICC International
Court of Arbitration will fix the seat. Involving the
supervisory body of an arbitral institution such as the LCIA
and ICC may allow the seat...
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