Carnegie Mellon V. Marvell: Marvell Loses $1.17 Billion Jury Verdict And Jury Finds Marvell's Infringement Willful After Court Precludes Marvell From Relying On Its Own Patents As A Defense

In the patent infringement action brought by Carnegie Mellon University ("Carnegie Mellon" or "CMU") against Marvell Technology Group, LTD. ("Marvell'), the jury returned a verdict in favor of Carnegie Mellon in the amount of $1.17 billion, finding that Marvell had infringed two patents owned by Carnegie Mellon. The jury also found that Marvell's infringement of the patents was willful, paving the way for the potential for enhanced damages as well as an award of attorneys' fees. Marvell has vowed to challenge the damage award before the district court and, if necessary, the Federal Circuit.

A few days before the jury returned its verdict, Carnegie Mellon filed a motion to preclude Marvell from relying on an advice of counsel defense to defend against the charge of willful infringement. Carnegie Mellon filed a motion to strike the testimony of one of Marvell's witnesses and also to preclude Marvell from relying on an advice of counsel defense.

With respect to the motion to strike, the district court reasoned as follows: "On this point, the Court finds that CMU did not pursue the nature of the communications with patent counsel that Dr. Wu disclosed during his discovery deposition, see Wu Deposition 7/29/10 at 23, at that time by filing a motion to compel him to provide further explication of his answers. CMU also did not challenge the privilege log provided by Marvell during discovery. Because no such motions were brought, the Court has not issued any orders addressing the allegedly privileged communications. (See Civ. A. No. 09-290, Docket Report). Given same, Marvell has not violated any orders of court and the Court finds that the "extreme sanction" of striking evidence is not appropriate. Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp., 112 F.3d 710, 719 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894, 905 (3d Cir. 1977)) (striking of evidence is normally reserved for a "showing of willful deception or 'flagrant disregard' of a court order by the proponent of evidence."). Further, CMU did not make any contemporaneous objection during Dr. Wu's direct examination and seek to strike his testimony at that time. See 12/11/12 Transcript at 323. Instead, CMU objected during the in camera examination of Dr. Wu on December 13, 2012 and advised the Court that it may be filing a motion in limine at that time. See 12/13/12 Transcript at 74. The present motion, however, was not filed until four days later, on December 17, 2012...