California Supreme Court Holds That Discrimination Claimants Need Not Demand Public Accommodation To Sue

California's Unruh Civil Rights Act, Code of Civil Procedure 52(a), provides for an award of damages of no less than $4,000 for each and every offense against a business that "denies, aids or incites a denial, or makes any discrimination" by providing less than full and equal services based on "sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, marital status, or sexual orientation."1 For two decades, litigants have debated over the breadth of standing under the Act. Defendants have argued that only those who request equal treatment or accommodation can sue. Plaintiffs have argued that it is enough that the plaintiff was "deterred" from making such a demand because he or she believed that it would be futile. On May 31, 2007, the California Supreme Court staked a middle course.

In Angelucci v. Century Supper Club, the court unanimously ruled that an individual alleging that a business discriminated against him need not show that he requested, and was refused, nondiscriminatory treatment in order to bring a claim under the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Its reasoning, however, strongly suggests that it would reject so-called "deterrence" claims.

Angelucci was a challenge to a common nightclub and restaurant promotion known as a "ladies night." Marc Angelucci,2 along with three other men, patronized the Century Supper Club on several occasions. On each visit, Angelucci and the others were charged a higher cover charge than the women patronizing the club. Specifically, Angelucci claims that on one occasion he was charge $20, while the cover for women was only $15, and that two days later he was charged $20, while women were allowed in for free.

The Superior Court granted summary judgment for Century Supper Club, and the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed. In its ruling, the Second District stressed the plaintiffs' failure to affirmatively demand equal treatment from Century, holding "that there must be an affirmative assertion of the right to equal treatment." The court added that this policy would avoid individuals exploiting the law for financial gain and only allow claims in which "genuine grievances" could be remedied.

Chief Justice Ronald M. George, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, reversed.

In its analysis, the court first looked to the ordinary meaning of the language of the Act in light of its legislative purpose. Drawing on the similarity of the Act and the federal Constitution's use of "deny"...