Court Of Appeal Clarifies Ambit Of Res Judicata / Henderson v Henderson Principles

The Court of Appeal has taken the opportunity to clarify the scope of the linked principles of Res Judicata/the Rule in Henderson v Henderson. Res Judicata is the principle that a party cannot litigate issues between it and another party/parties if these issues have already been determined by a Court in a prior case between the parties. The linked Rule in Henderson v Henderson is to the effect that if a party could have pleaded an issue in previous proceedings between parties it cannot then do it in subsequent litigation between these parties.

In Dominic Carney v Bank of Scotland Plc (formerly Bank of Scotland (Ireland) Limited) and Gearoid Costelloe [2017] IECA 295, the Court had to consider the extent to which a Circuit Court Judgment obtained on Motion in default of Defence could be relied upon as the basis for the High Court striking out an analogous claim before it between the same parties pursuant to the principles of Res Judicata/Henderson v Henderson principles. The case essentially concerned whether a Receiver, Mr. Costelloe, had validly taken possession of a commercial property following default in payment of a mortgage. In an ex tempore judgment handed down in the High Court by Mr. Justice Binchy, he was satisfied that the Circuit Court judgment obtained on 19 May 2015 (on Affidavit, and being on foot of a second Motion brought for judgment in default of Defence) could indeed bind the High Court pursuant to the Res Judicata/Henderson principles.

Before the Court of Appeal, the Appellant argued that in fact the High Court Judge had erred in finding that all of the matters before the High Court effectively mirrored prior pleas that had been before the Circuit Court at the time the final judgment was handed down. In particular, the Appellant argued both that certain pleas before the High Court were new and had not formed part of the Circuit Court proceedings and that other claims were in fact claims that could not have formed part of the Circuit Court proceedings at all as the cause of action arose at a later date.

The Court of Appeal, however, considered that the ex tempore judgment of Mr. Justice Binchy had to be read as a whole and it was clear when that happened, and it was clear from the various submissions that had been made before it (which were opened again before the Court of Appeal), that in fact Mr. Justice Binchy had effectively found that the claim of the Appellant should be struck out as constituting either res...