Even The DCHRA Has Its Limits: Court Dismisses Discrimination Claim By Employee Allegedly Terminated For Opposing Gay Marriage

As Gallaudet University's Chief Diversity Officer, Plaintiff Angela McCaskill was tasked with promoting a diverse and inclusive college community. In October 2012, several of McCaskill's co-workers learned that she had signed a petition to place Maryland's Proposition 6 — a state constitutional amendment that would have banned same-sex marriage — on the ballot. When this fact became more widely known on campus, Gallaudet administrators decided that McCaskill's ability to advocate for her constituents — in particular, the University's gay community — had been compromised.

As a result of that decision, Gallaudet placed her on administrative leave and, ultimately, demoted her. When the University failed to restore McCaskill to her position after the furor had died down, she filed a lawsuit alleging that the University had violated the DCHRA's prohibitions against various forms of discrimination and had intentionally or negligently caused her emotional distress. She also asserted that, after she signed the petition, the University — acting through two of its employees — defamed her and placed her in a false light. The University filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.

To adequately plead discriminatory treatment under the DCHRA, McCaskill had to establish that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination. McCaskill alleged discriminatory treatment on the basis of several grounds: race, religion, sexual orientation, marital status, and political affiliation. While she successfully alleged the first two elements for a DCHRA claim, according to the Court, "her stumbling block arrives at step three." To satisfy that third requirement, she had to plead facts showing that Gallaudet took the adverse action because of her protected status — that is, that the action "was not attributable to a common legitimate reason." Mere speculation as to the employer's motivation cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

"To adequately plead discriminatory treatment under the DCHRA, McCaskill had to establish that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination." According to the Court, McCaskill did not allege any facts that could allow a jury to conclude that Gallaudet took prohibited actions because of her...