Decisions That Have Been Reversed Or Vacated "On Other Grounds": Do They Still Have Precedential Value?

• Jurisdiction: Michigan,United States,Federal
• Law Firm: Dickinson Wright PLLC
• Subject Matter: Employment and HR, Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration, Retirement, Superannuation & Pensions, Class Actions
• Author: Mr Phillip DeRosier
• Published date: 18 May 2023

Many of us have, at one time or another, found ourselves citing a decision that had been either reversed or vacated "on other grounds." But are those decisions precedential? Does it matter whether the decision was "reversed" or "vacated"? Although Michigan and federal courts are in agreement that a decision that has been vacated lacks precedential effect, even if on other grounds or without addressing the merits of the decision being vacated, it can be more tricky when it comes to decisions that have been reversed'at least in Michigan.¹

Vacated Decisions Never Have Precedential Value, Even if Vacated "On Other Grounds"

Federal courts have often said that "[a] decision may be reversed on other grounds, but a decision that has been vacated has no precedential authority whatsoever." Durning v Citibank, N A, 950 F2d 1419, 1424 n 2 (CA 9, 1991), citing O'Connor v Donaldson, 422 US 563, 578 n 12; 45 L Ed 2d 396; 95 S Ct 2486 (1975) ("Of necessity our decision vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals deprives that court's opinion of precedential effect, leaving this Court's opinion and judgment as the sole law of the case.").

This is also the general rule in Michigan. As the Michigan Court of Appeals has explained: "'[A] Court of Appeals opinion that has been vacated by the majority of the Supreme Court without an expression of approval or disapproval of this Court's reasoning is not precedentially binding.'" People v Mungo, 295 Mich App 537, 554; 813 NW2d 792 (2012). See also Miller v Farm Bureau Ins Co, 218 Mich App 221, 232 n 3; 553 NW2d 371 (1996) ("To the extent that the Mattson panel relied on Miller I, its holding has no precedential value because that decision was ultimately vacated by the Supreme Court.").

Of course, this is not to say that courts always practice what they preach. Both the Michigan Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have treated decisions as having precedential value notwithstanding the fact thathey had been "vacated on other grounds." For example, in People v Hendrickson, 459 Mich 229; 586 NW2d 906 (1998), the Supreme Court relied on the Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v Hawkins, 59 F3d 723, 730 (CA 8, 1995), vacated on other grounds 516 US 1168 (1996), in deciding whether a crime victim's statement that she had just been beaten was sufficiently contemporaneous to warrant admission under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at 237. Similarly, in Bennett v Mackinac Bridge Auth, 289 Mich App 616; 808 NW2d 471 (2010), the Court of Appeals relied in part on Juncaj v C & H Industries, 161 Mich App 724, 734; 411 NW2d 839 (1987), vacated on other grounds 432 Mich 1219, 434 NW2d 644 (1989), to hold that doctrine of res judicata "must not be applied when its application would subvert the...