First Amendment Does Not Prevent State From Firing Employee For Derogatory Facebook Comments

Richard Raysman is a Partner in our New York office.

Though the First Amendment affords greater free speech protections for government employees relative to those in the private sector, the speakers do not have carte blanche to insult or deride whomever they see fit. Rather, courts will balance the interest a governmental entity may have in regulating speech versus the constitutional rights of the speaker.

A recent case arose which presents the attempt of one court to balance these interests in the context of postings made on Facebook. In Shepherd v. McGee, No. 03:12-cv-02216-HZ, 2013 WL 5963076 (D. Or. Nov. 7, 2013), the plaintiff sued her former employer, the Oregon Department of Health Services ("DHS"), under a theory of First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that her firing was as a result of derogatory Facebook comments she made about individuals on public assistance, and that it was thus unconstitutional pursuant to her First Amendment rights to free speech.

The plaintiff was employed as a child protective services worker ("CPS") who determined child custody cases. She could be called into court as a result of this work. On multiple occasions, the plaintiff posted to her Facebook derogatory remarks about individuals on public assistance, including a suggestion of sterilization for individuals who have previously had their parental rights terminated. After an investigation, DHS fired the plaintiff.

In its analysis, the court looked to the five-step test for evaluating a First Amendment retaliation claim against a government worker, though it primarily focused on the fourth factor: "whether the state had adequate justification for treating the employee differently from other members of the general public." See Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2009) (listing the entire five-step test). The court agreed that the state had adequate justification for treating the plaintiff differently, e.g. firing her, for a number of reasons. First, the...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT