Coventry V Lawrence: More Flexibility About Awarding Damages Over An Injunction

Summary and implications

Following a benchmark Supreme Court ruling (Coventry v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13) fewer injunctions can be expected to remedy infringements of property rights. Whilst the case concerned a complaint about noise nuisance, the judgment is relevant to all property rights, and in particular whether the court will award damages instead of an injunction where a developer infringes a neighbour's right of light.

The case strongly criticises the recent tendency to mechanically apply existing principles and award an injunction rather than damages. Instead, the Supreme Court endorsed a more flexible approach when awarding a remedy. If the approach suggested by the Supreme Court is adopted in practice, it is likely that fewer injunctions will be granted and that damages will become a more common alternative remedy. This represents a departure from a severe judicial trend to award injunctions even when the loss suffered is slight and the impact on the wrongdoer is severe (HKRUK II (CHC) Ltd v Heaney [2010] EWHC 2245 Ch).

Background facts

Coventry was the lessee of a stadium near Lawrence's house. Planning permission was granted for "speedway racing and associated facilities" to Coventry's predecessor in title in 1975. Stock-car racing began on Coventry's land in 1984, which was not a permitted action under the 1975 planning permission. It was submitted by Coventry that these actions had become immune from planning control after 10 years of operation, however the operations in the stadium created noise that could be heard by local residents.

Lawrence appealed against the Court of Appeal's decision to overturn an injunction granted because actions on Coventry's land did not constitute a nuisance. The Supreme Court restored the initial court's award of an injunction finding that there was a noise nuisance. In doing so, the court addressed two important points.

Nuisance as an easement

Lord Neuberger held that an action that would otherwise constitute a nuisance is capable of becoming an easement. Such an easement would run with the land and therefore bind successors in title.

In order to gain a prescriptive right to carry out an action that would otherwise be deemed a nuisance, it is necessary to prove that the action has been a nuisance for 20 years and not simply that it has been carried out for 20 years. In this case, the Supreme Court held that the requisite 20-year period had not been satisfied and therefore the right by...