Labour & Employment Legal Update - Special Edition
Supreme Court Rules That ADA Permits Employers to Deny Job to Disabled
On June
10, 2002, the United States Supreme Court, in an unanimous decision, ruled that
the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA" or the
"Act") allows an employer to screen out potential employees with
disabilities who pose a risk on the job to their own health or safety. In Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal,1 the plaintiff, Mario Echazabal,
began working in 1972 for independent contractors at an oil refinery owned by
Chevron. In the early 1990's Echazabal twice applied for a position directly
with Chevron, and, each time, Chevron made a job offer to Echazabal, contingent
on his ability to pass a physical. Chevron subsequently withdrew each of the
job offers after Echazabal's physicals revealed a liver abnormality, later
identified to have resulted from Echazabal's contraction of Hepatitis C.
Chevron withdrew its job offers based on statements made by company physicians
that Echazabal's condition would be aggravated by exposure to toxins at the Chevron
refinery.
Following
the withdrawal of its second job offer to Echazabal, Chevron asked the
contractor that employed him to reassign Echazabal to a position without
exposure to toxins, or to remove him from the refinery entirely. The contractor
laid Echazabal off in 1996.
Echazabal
sued Chevron under the ADA, claiming that the company refused to hire him and
refused to allow him to continue working for the contractors because of his
disability in violation of the Act. For its defense, Chevron asserted that the
EEOC regulations interpreting the ADA permitted an employer to deny employment
to a qualified individual with a disability who would pose a "direct
threat" to his own health if he were hired.2
Echazabal
argued that the EEOC "threat to self" regulation relied upon by
Chevron impermissibly exceeded the scope of the ADA. Specifically, Echazabal
contended that the Act creates an affirmative defense where an applicant is
denied a position because he cannot meet a qualification standard that is
"job-related" and "consistent with business necessity."3
Under the ADA, such a qualification standard may include "a requirement
that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals in the workplace," if the applicant or employee cannot
perform the job safely with reasonable accommodation.4 Echazabal
argued that the EEOC, through its regulations, impermissibly expanded the
qualification standard to include "a requirement that an individual shall
not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of the individual or others
in the workplace."5
Essentially,
Echazabal asserted that because he did not pose a threat to others, but only to
himself, the employer should not be entitled to the defense, and should not be
permitted to exclude him from the workplace because of his disability. The
Supreme Court disagreed.
The Court
held that, because the ADA states that qualification standards falling within
the limits of job relation and business necessity "may include" the
denial of positions to persons who would pose a direct threat to
"others," the statutory language is broad enough to permit the denial
of employment to individuals who pose a threat to themselves only.6
The Court
concluded that Echazabal's narrow reading of the statute would unnecessarily
limit the number of persons whose safety could be considered to only
"others" who were "in the workplace." This was not, the
Court reasoned, what Congress intended. The Court theorized, "When Congress
specified threats to others in the...
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