No Duty To Consult In The Legislative Process – Courtoreille v. Canada, 2016 FCA 311

The Federal Court of Appeal recently released a significant decision that limits the scope of Crown conduct that may trigger itsduty to consult with Aboriginal peoples and reinforces parliamentary privilege. In Courtoreille v. Canada, released on December 7, 2016, the Federal Court of Appeal concluded that the entire legislative process - from the discussion of policy options to the introduction and passage of legislation - cannot trigger the duty to consult regardless of whether the legislation at issue has the potential to adversely impact asserted or established Aboriginal or treaty rights.

This decision overturned a previous ruling by the Federal Court (2014 FC 1244) which held that the federal government had a duty to consult the Mikisew Cree following the introduction of the contentious Omnibus legislation (Bills C-38 and C-45) in 2012 that made changes to Canada's environmental assessment regime through CEAA 2012, as well as related environmental legislation including the Fisheries Act, Species at Risk Act, and the Navigable Waters Protection Act (now Navigation Protection Act). This Omnibus legislation sought to streamline certain regulatory processes and reduce the number of projects that were subject to federal environmental assessment. At the Federal Court level, the Mikisew Cree argued that the duty to consult was triggered by the development and introduction of the new legislation because it reduced federal regulatory oversight on works or projects that may affect the Mikisew Cree's treaty rights to hunt, fish, and trap. The Federal Court found that the Crown did have a duty to consult the Mikisew Cree - but only after the two bills were introduced in Parliament, not before. The scope of the duty was limited to providing notice and a reasonable opportunity to make submissions, and the relief granted by the Federal Court was solely declaratory in nature since the Omnibus Bills had already passed into law

In overturning the Federal Court decision, Justice De Montigny of the Federal Court of Appeal concluded that the legislative actions at issue were immune from judicial review, stating that "[i]f there is one principle that is beyond any doubt, it is that courts will not supervise the legislative process and will provide no relief until a bill has been enacted." (at para. 59). Even if the actions were not immune from judicial review, Justice De Montigny held that it would be an undue interference with Parliament's process and...