Probation Company Is Not A Government Entity For The Purpose Of CAFA

McGee v. Sentinel Offender Servs., LLC, 2013 WL 2436658 (11th Cir. June 6, 2013).

A question arose before the Eleventh Circuit if a probation company is a government entity so that it could not assert federal jurisdiction under CAFA. The Eleventh Circuit held that the probation company who is contracted by the state for services was an officer of court like private attorneys, and not a government entity for the purpose of CAFA.

The plaintiff, a convict, brought an action in Superior Court of Richmond County, asking the Court to hold the defendant in criminal contempt of court for resisting the Superior Court's order granting the plaintiff a writ of habeas corpus and using its position as a probation company to attempt to collect a debt that was not owed or due by threatening to have the plaintiff jailed without bond. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity as defined by the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq.

Earlier, in a misdemeanor action, the plaintiff had been sentenced to prison. His sentence was later suspended and he was placed on probation. When the plaintiff stopped reporting and failed to pay supervision fees to the defendant, a private probation services, his probation was revoked. The plaintiff was instructed to pay the due, but when he failed to do so, he was sent to jail.

Thereafter, the Superior Court of Richmond County granted the plaintiff's petition for habaeus corpus, holding that the plaintiff lacked the mental competence to waive his right to counsel at his probation revocation hearing, and that the plaintiff's continued confinement would be unlawful. After the plaintiff's release, the defendant sent him two letters stating that he had failed to report to his probation officer and that he must pay his dues failing which the defendant would petition the court to revoke his probation.

The defendant removed this action to the District Court pursuant to the diversity jurisdiction, and the District Court denied the plaintiff's motion to remand.

Subsequently, the District Court issued a permanent injunction forbidding the defendant from taking any action to collect any fee or to have any arrest warrant issued that would interfere with the habeas relief granted. The District Court also acknowledged that the plaintiff had withdrawn his petition for contempt.

The defendant asserted a counterclaim seeking a declaration...

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