Safety Is Not Rocket Science

Law FirmBCL Solicitors LLP
Subject MatterEmployment and HR, Health & Safety
AuthorMr Tom McNeill
Published date03 March 2023

Last year, in its ten year strategy, the Health and Safety Executive announced that it is looking to regulate workplace safety in 'different ways', in the light of the maturity and understanding of business in managing such risks.1 What does such an intention mean for organisations with mature health and safety systems which have conscientiously sought to ensure safety, if they experience a serious accident?

All Accidents Are Preventable

There is a notion that all accidents are preventable. 'Are they indeed?' writes the safety expert and author, Carsten Busch, 'Why then do we not see this happening in our everyday observations? Just check the news or you company's incident statistics. Why are we still having accidents after almost a century of more or less serious safety management efforts, scientific and technical progress and increased societal demands through better standards and regulations?'

Busch suggests that it would be more accurate to say that all accidents are preventable... given unlimited knowledge, resources and perfect prediction (plus quite some luck). Busch advocates realism about what Safety can and cannot achieve, in the light of the limitations of knowledge, resources, time and people. Busch is careful to note that this is not the same as fatalism, quoting Professor James Reason, a world leading expert on human error (and propounder of the 'Swiss cheese model'): 'Safety is a guerrilla war that you will probably lose (since entropy gets us all in the end), but you can still do the best you can.'

In guidance 'HSG48: Reducing Error and Influencing Behaviour', first published over thirty years ago, the HSE reflected the same insight: 'We all make errors irrespective of how much training and experience we possess or how motivated we are to do it right. Failures are more serious for jobs where the consequences of errors are not protected. However, errors can occur in all tasks, not just those which are called safety-critical.' The guidance suggests various measures that can be taken to *reduce* human errors and violations and minimise the safety risks arising from errors that cannot be prevented.

The extent to which 'error' can be eliminated or controlled - and the methodology for doing so - is hotly contested. In this context, HSG48 (1999 edition) includes this illuminating paragraph: 'Over the last 20 years we have learnt much more about the origins of human failure. We can now challenge the commonly held belief that incidents and accidents are the result of a 'human error' by a worker in the 'front line'. Attributing incidents to 'human error' has often been seen as a sufficient explanation in itself and something which is beyond the control of managers. This view is no longer acceptable to society as a whole. Organisations must recognise that they need to consider human factors as a distinct element which must be recognised, assessed and managed effectively in order to control risks.'

A few years later, in guidance 'Investigating Accidents and Incidents' (2004), the HSE went a step further: 'Blaming individuals is ultimately fruitless and sustains the myth that accidents and cases of ill health are unavoidable when the opposite is true. Well thought-out risk control measures, combined with adequate supervision, monitoring and effective management (ie your risk management system) will ensure that your work activities are safe...The root causes of adverse events are almost inevitably management, organisational or planning failures.'

If this is suggesting that all accidents are preventable - and preventable by better health and safety management - then such guidance is doing no more than reflecting how the HSE and other regulators have approached health and safety enforcement since the 1990s.

The Robens Report

In fact, the importance of cultural, organisational and behavioural matters has long been recognised. What has been doubted is the wisdom, and principled justification, for prosecuting organisations which have conscientiously sought to fulfil their health and safety duties.

The Robens Report, the culmination of an extensive review by the Committee on Health and Safety at Work which the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 sought to implement, for example includes: 'With some notable exceptions here and there, the great bulk of the existing provisions are concerned with physical circumstances - the safeguarding of machinery, the provision of adequate lighting and ventilation, and so on. These things are important. But it has long been widely accepted that equally important factors in safety and health at work are the attitudes, capacities and performance of people and the efficiency of the organisational systems within which they work. This is not yet adequately reflected in the legislation...'.

And: 'It is not to underrate the importance of physical safeguards to say that preoccupation with the...

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