Supreme Court Of Canada Explains Constitutional Right To Collective Bargaining

In a decision released January 16, 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada once again revisited how much constitutional protection is afforded to the collective bargaining process. In Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 1, the Court held that a special labour relations regime legislated for the RCMP infringed section 2(d) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (freedom of association) and could not be justified as a reasonable limit under section 1. The relevant provisions were struck down, but will remain in effect for the rest of 2015 so that the Government can enact a replacement regime.

Collective bargaining was historically denied to RCMP members on the basis that it was necessary to preserve the RCMP's stability, reliability, and image of neutrality. Initially, the RCMP was excluded outright from any labour relations scheme. Then, beginning in the 1970s, a series of reforms gradually allowed for some degree of representation, while limiting employees' rights to be represented in grievances or other proceedings. At the time the case was heard, this system had evolved into three entities, with the Staff Relations Representative Program, or SRRP, at its core. The SRRP involves representatives who act as a point of contact with RCMP management but work under the assumption that management has the final say. The case was brought by several associations that lobby on behalf of RCMP officers, although none has ever been recognized as a collective bargaining agent by management or the Government.

The majority of the Court decided that the SRRP was an unconstitutional deprivation of collective bargaining rights. In doing so, the majority clarified what section 2(d) protects:

(1) The right to join with others and form associations; (2) The right to join with others in pursuit of other constitutional rights; and (3) The right to join with others on equal terms the power and strength of other groups.

The Court held that in deciding whether section 2(d) of the Charter has been violated, the question is whether there has been substantial interference with the employee's right to a "meaningful process" of collective bargaining. This "meaningful process" essentially boils down to employee choice and independence from management. The requirement of employee choice is satisfied by a process that allows employees to have effective input. Employees may do this through creating associations, dissolving existing ones, and...