The Applicability Of California's Anti-SLAPP Statute To Alleged Legal Malpractice Actions

Although actions brought against attorneys by third parties for "litigation-related activities" are generally subject to California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the "anti-SLAPP statute"), actions brought against attorneys by former clients for the breach of a professional duty are not within the purview of section 425.16. (Benasra v. Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1179; Freeman v. Schack (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 719; PrediWave Corp. v. Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1204; Castleman v. Sargaser (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 481; Loanvest I, LLC v. Utrecht (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 496; Jespersen v. Zubiate-Beauchamp (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 624, 627.)

A recent appellate decision extended that rule in a previously unclear area. In Sprengel v. Zbylut (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 140, the Court of Appeal went one step further when it held that the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply even when an attorney-client relationship between the parties has not been established.

The Sprengel matter arose from a disagreement between Sprengel and her former business partner Mohr. Sprengel and Mohr had jointly formed the LLC Purposeful Press to market one of Sprengel's books. When the business partnership fell apart, Sprengel sued Mohr for involuntary dissolution and copyright infringement. Mohr was represented by Gregory Zbylit and Leopold, Petrich & Smith. (Id. at 145.)

After the action between Sprengel and Mohr was resolved, Sprengel sued the lawyers that represented Mohr for legal malpractice, arguing that the position taken by the lawyers in the prior action was adverse to her and that she was in fact their client because the lawyers represented Purposeful Press, of which she was a 50-percent owner. The lawyers responded to the suit by filing a motion under the anti-SLAPP statute. (Id. at 145-147.)

The anti-SLAPP statute requires that a court engage in a two-step process in order to determine whether a defendant's anti-SLAPP motion should be granted. "The sole inquiry under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute is whether the plaintiff's claims arise from protected speech or petitioning activity." (Castleman, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th 481, 490-491.)

The Sprengel court held that the claims made by Sprengel could not be distinguished from the claims made in the Benasra, Freeman, PrediWave, Castleman and Loanvest cases. "The 'principle thrust' of Sprengel's claims is that defendants violated the duty of loyalty they owed...