U.S. Supreme Court Announces New Standard For Pregnancy Discrimination Claims

On Wednesday the U.S. Supreme Court issued its much-anticipated decision in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), which involves a claim of pregnancy discrimination under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).

Young, a UPS driver, claimed that UPS intentionally discriminated against her by refusing to accommodate her pregnancy-related lifting restriction by transferring her to a light duty position. UPS countered that its refusal to accommodate was based on a legitimate, non-discriminatory business reason. Namely, its refusal was based on provisions of a collective bargaining agreement that provided light duty only to drivers who were injured on the job, who had lost their Department of Transportation certifications and who suffered from a disability covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

UPS won dismissal of the claim on summary judgment, which the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. In a 6-3 vote, the Supreme Court vacated summary judgment for UPS and remanded to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to reconsider whether summary judgment is appropriate under a new standard for liability under the PDA. The majority decision, penned by Justice Breyer, was joined by four other Justices as well as a concurring decision by Justice Alito. Justices Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy dissented in two separate dissents, one written by Justice Scalia and the other by Justice Kennedy. ate treatment claims brought under the PDA.

The new standard announced by the Court is a twist on the three-stage burden shifting paradigm established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), used to evaluate disparate treatment discrimination claims. However, the Court made clear the new standard is applicable solely to PDA claims where the plaintiff has asserted that she has been denied an accommodation for a pregnancy-related work restriction given to others who are not pregnant but similar in their ability or inability to work. In such a case, if an employer has pointed to a neutral policy as its legitimate reason for the differential treatment (and denial of the accommodation), a plaintiff can demonstrate that the policy is a pretext for disparate treatment discrimination by proving that the policy imposed a "significant burden" on pregnant workers and that the reasons for the policy are not "sufficiently strong to justify the burden."

The PDA and the Parties' Positions in Young

Congress passed the PDA as a response to the...