Wisconsin Supreme Court's Misapplication Of The Pollution Exclusion And Disregard For Policyholders' Business And Purpose In Purchasing Insurance

Last week, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued two opinions in which it held that pollution exclusions barred coverage for third-party claims resulting from alleged contamination of water due to the seepage of cow manure and septage, respectively. As addressed in Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson's dissents to the two decisions, the majority's opinions in both cases - Wilson Mutual Insurance Co. v. Falk, Nos. 2013AP691, 2013AP776, 2014 WL 7375656 (Wis. Dec. 30, 2014), and Preisler v. General Casualty Insurance Co., No. 2012AP2521, 2014 WL 7373070 (Wis. Dec. 30, 2014) - were faulty for a number of reasons.

Notably, Preisler considered whether there was insurance coverage available for claims against companies that haul, store, and/or dispose of septage. As the Chief Justice explained, "[t]hese septic companies purchased general liability policies to insure their business operations, that is, they purchased insurance policies to cover damage they might cause in the ordinary course of their hauling, storing, and disposing of septage." But when that very damage occurred, the majority held that septage was a "pollutant" and that coverage for the claims was therefore barred by the applicable pollution exclusion.

This thinking is deeply disconcerting as it overlooks the very reason that these companies would have purchased insurance. Indeed, Justice Abrahamson observed:

I conclude that a reasonable person in the position of the insureds, two companies in the business of hauling, storing, and disposing of septage, would not consider septage a pollutant under the pollution exclusion clause of general liability policies they purchased to cover liability for damage caused by their septic business operations.

Justice Abrahamson was right to consider why the companies would have purchased insurance in the first instance. Indeed, in assessing the application of a pollution exclusion, it is imperative that a court consider the nature of the business in which the policyholder is engaged. It would seem troubling to conclude, for example, that an insurer can take a...